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PROLOGUE 
hen the European Commission drafted the Europe 2020 Strategy 
and the European Council adopted it in 2010, the financial and 
economic crises had already been in full swing for over two 
years. At that time, however, it was thought that thanks to an 
unprecedented deployment of monetary and fiscal stimulus, the developed 
world had stopped the downward spiral and could return to a ‘normal’ 
growth path. Few anticipated at the time that the crisis would mutate into a 
fully fledged eurozone crisis with the potential to tear the eurozone and the 
European Union apart.  
At first sight it might appear that the Europe 2020 Strategy and the 
eurozone crisis are completely unrelated.  However, our report shows that 
in reality there are close links.  Two aspects are particularly striking: 
First, the crisis seems to strike in particular countries which in our 
analysis stand out as under-performers. 
Second, the most important omission from the Europe 2020 Strategy 
flagged by us concerns the integration and regulation of financial markets.  
The Europe 2020 Strategy looks at the EU27 as a whole, but for it to 
work, it requires efforts at the member state level, especially those that are 
lagging on a number of indicators.  
The eurozone crisis has rendered this need even more apparent and 
brought into sharp focus the deep structural imbalances between the core 
of the eurozone, here in particular Germany, but more generally all 
member countries north of the Alps, and a number of Southern countries 
like Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece. All four of these Mediterranean 
countries suffered and still suffer from the same phenomena: overall 
employment rates are low due to the fact that the utilization of their female 
labour force lies idle, and the overall stocks of intangible capital are below 
the EU average leading among other things to suboptimal investment in 
the innovation capacities of their firms. To these handicaps one has to add 
W
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high levels of corruption and inefficient governmental structures, especially 
in Greece and Italy.  
These fundamental factors are the underlying cause of the crisis, 
which is unlikely to abate until deep reforms allow the crisis countries to 
increase their productivity.. 
The second aspect which the euro crisis has brought into sharp focus 
is the malfunctioning of financial markets. During the boom phase, capital 
flowed into today’s crisis countries at unprecedented rates, financing 
construction and consumption sprees that should have been recognized as 
unsustainable even when they were happening, and not only in hindsight. 
Now, during the bust phase, the same markets are withholding all capital 
from the periphery countries, thus deepening the crisis by pushing their 
governments and banks to the brink of insolvency, thus making a recovery 
even more difficult. This constitutes a real-life illustration of our 
observation that a key element missing in the Europe 2020 strategy was a 
profound reform of financial markets, which is needed not only to 
overcome this crisis (as was recognised by the euro area summit of 29 June 
2012) but also so that the boom/bust patterns at national level can be 
avoided in future. 
We still retain the hope that a combination of profound reforms in the 
crisis countries and the reform of financial market supervision now in 
process will allow the eurozone and thus the entire EU to emerge 
strengthened from the present crisis. 
 
Daniel Gros and Felix Roth 
Brussels, August 2012 
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INTRODUCTION 
aunched in March 2010 by the European Commission, the Europe 
2020 strategy (European Commission, 2010a) aims at achieving 
“smart, sustainable and inclusive” growth. The engines driving this 
growth are: i) knowledge and innovation, ii) a greener and more efficient 
use of resources and iii) higher employment combined with social and 
territorial cohesion. 
More concretely, the Europe 2020 strategy aims to: 
i) achieve a target for R&D expenditure of 3% of GDP (but also 
acknowledges the need to develop an indicator that would better 
reflect innovation intensity), 
ii) increase the employment rate of the population aged 20-64 from the 
current 69% to 75% (through a greater involvement of women, older 
workers and better integration of migrant workers), 
iii) lower the dropout rate to 10% from the current 15% and increase the 
share of the population aged 30-34 having completed tertiary 
education from 31% to 40%, 
iv) cut the number of Europeans who are at risk of poverty or exclusion 
by 20 million citizens and 
v) reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20% compared with 1990 
levels or by 30% if the conditions are right, raising the share of 
renewable energy sources in our final energy consumption to 20% 
and moving towards a 20% increase in energy efficiency. 
This report sheds light on the question of whether these five goals of 
the Europe 2020 strategy will foster the global competitiveness of European 
economies. The report is structured as follows: chapter 1 elaborates upon 
the different concepts of competitiveness given in the literature and 
highlights the authors’ own definition of competitiveness. Chapter 2 looks 
L
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at the dimension of innovation, considering whether investment in R&D is 
a useful indicator of innovative capacity and proposing an alternative 
indicator, namely investment in intangible capital. Chapter 3 focuses on 
employability and argues that the planned skills upgrade will constitute 
the best means to increase employment, but that this might not be enough 
to reach the 75% employment benchmark. Chapter 4 discusses education 
along with the quality and quantity of the labour forces in the European 
economies in comparison with OECD countries and China. Chapter 5 
delves into social cohesion in terms of the determinants of the rates of those 
at risk of poverty or exclusion. Chapter 6 finds that the current climate 
goals are unlikely to have a significant impact on global warming and that 
the conditions are right to be more ambitious, arguing the EU’s internal 
pricing of carbon should be complemented by an external element (a 
carbon import tax). Chapter 7 briefly reviews the new governance structure 
and the coherence of the macroeconomic scoreboards, as well as the trade-
offs between the various indicators of the Europe 2020 strategy, the 
European semester and the euro-plus pact. Chapter 8 concludes with 
relevant policy steps to foster the future capability of European economies 
and their prosperity.  
A first question one might ask is how likely it is that the 2020 targets 
will be reached on the basis of the performance of the EU economy over the 
last ten years? A rapid, simple exercise projecting the performance of 2000–
10 forward to the year 2020 yields some interesting conclusions. 
It is difficult to see how the target for R&D spending could be 
achieved, given that the share of R&D in GDP has practically remained 
constant at slightly below 2% of GDP over the last decade and one does not 
see many concrete measures being taken that could lead to a jump in R&D 
spending. 
Similarly, it is difficult to see how the employment target can be 
reached given that the employment rate has moved by only about 2.5 
percentage points over the last few years and would have to increase by 
more than 6 percentage points over the next decade. But it is hard to judge 
the extent to which the current employment rate has been affected by the 
recession and how much it would increase if the EU economy were to 
recover fully from the impact of the financial market crisis of 2007–09 and 
the euro debt crisis of 2010–11. 
The target for education should be easy to reach, considering that the 
tertiary graduation rate among the younger cohorts has increased over the 
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last ten years from 22% to about 33%. A similar increase over the next ten 
years would bring it to over 43% and thus way over the target. 
The target for reducing the dropout rate to 10% (from 14.1% in 2009) 
should be attainable, bearing in mind that this rate fell between 2000 and 
2009 by 3.5 percentage points. A rate of progress that is only a little higher 
than in the past would be needed for that. 
The target on poverty or exclusion reduction is more difficult to 
judge. At the aggregate level, the official statistics report a rapid reduction 
in the number of persons at risk of poverty or exclusion (about 10 million) 
in the last four years for which data are available (2005–09). However, this 
improvement was due almost exclusively to the 10 new member states 
from Central and Eastern Europe, and in particular to Poland (with a 
reduction of 6.6 million citizens).  
How can this 2020 target be reached? One cannot just project the 
indicators from the last five years of the 10 new member states (the 
transition countries) forward to 2020. At best they might converge to the 
EU average (of poverty or exclusion rates). This would yield a maximum 
reduction of another 10 million citizens from poverty or exclusion. 
However, the sum of the national targets of these countries is only about 
3.5 million, which would imply that the transition countries would in one 
decade cut the distance to the average by about one-third. However, this 
leads to the question where the other 16.5 million needed to attain the 
target would come from. The overall 2020 targets can only be achieved if 
the older member states really start to actively fight poverty and exclusion, 
but the rates of poverty and exclusion have actually increased over the last 
few years in these countries. It is difficult to judge how much of this is due 
to the recession and how much a recovery in the overall economy would 
help to achieve the 2020 targets these countries have set from themselves. 
Summing the national targets that exist for the old member countries yields 
only about 7.2 million.  
The sum of the existing national targets is thus only about 10.7 
million – a bit more than one-half of the official overall target. It is thus 
difficult to see how this target will be reached. As an aside, we note that the 
last official survey of the 2020 process does not even give the sum of the 
national targets with the official justification that the “result cannot be 
calculated because of differences in national methodologies” (see Table A.1 
in the Annex). Any independent evaluation of the Europe 2020 process 
would remain impossible if this were to remain the case.  
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The only area where reaching the target does not seem to pose any 
problem is that of the environment. This is due to the fact that for the two 
binding targets in this area there are precise mechanisms with either 
international obligations at the EU level or directives which ensure the 
result. However, for the only aspect in this domain for which no 
constraining EU mechanism exist (an increase of energy efficiency of 20%), 
the sum of the national commitments again falls significantly short of the 
overall EU target. 
One key aim of the Europe 2020 strategy was to be more transparent 
and credible by focusing on a small number of quantifiable and precise 
targets. This rapid survey of the five main targets shows, however, that at 
least one target cannot be even assessed because of differences in national 
definitions, and on most others it is doubtful that they will be reached. 
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1. EUROPE’S COMPETITIVENESS 
IN AN AGE OF RELATIVE DECLINE 
1.1 Defining the concept 
Classical definitions of competitiveness concentrate on the capacity of an 
economy to export and stress the notion that national economies, similar to 
companies, directly compete against one another. For example, the OECD’s 
Glossary of Statistical Terms defines competitiveness as “a measure of a 
country’s advantages or disadvantages in selling its products in 
international markets”.1  The definition given by the Longman Dictionary 
relates competition between firms to that between countries and defines 
competition as “the ability of a company, country, or a product to compete 
with others”.2 The same comparison between a firm and a nation is made 
by the Business Dictionary, which refers to competitiveness as “the ability of 
a firm or a nation to offer products and services that meet the quality 
standards of the local and world markets at prices that are competitive and 
provide adequate returns on the resources employed or consumed in 
producing them”.3  
Yet all three of these definitions of competiveness have at their heart 
the idea that competitiveness is about competing nations. This thought has 
been strongly rejected by Krugman (1994). To him, such a definition of 
competitiveness and the policies centred on it are flawed. More specifically, 
Krugman argues that “competitiveness is a meaningless word when 
                                                   
1 See “Competitiveness in International Trade”, Glossary of Statistical Terms, OECD 
(http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=399). 
2  Refer to “Competitiveness”, Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English 
(http://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/competitiveness). 
3 See “Competitiveness”, BusinessDictionary.com (http://www.businessdictionary.com/ 
definition/competitiveness.html). 
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applied to national economies”, that “the doctrine of widely accepted 
competitiveness is flatly wrong” and that “national living standards are 
overwhelmingly determined by domestic factors rather than by some 
competition for world markets”.4 
Krugman’s concept of competitiveness is in accordance with the 
definitions of other academics that place less stress on competition between 
nations and more on a nation’s ability to produce efficiently with its given 
resources. In this vein, Porter (1990), for example, emphasises that “a 
nation’s competitiveness depends on the capacity of its industry to 
innovate and upgrade” and that “the only meaningful concept of 
competitiveness at the national level is productivity”. 
In a recent presentation, Porter (2011) also defines state 
competitiveness as “the productivity with which a state utilizes its human, 
capital, and natural resources” and Lawrence argues that “the most 
important concept of competitiveness is not, therefore, how national 
performances compare or even how well countries perform in international 
trade. The critical issue for each economy is whether it is making the best 
use of its resources.”5 Similar definitions of competiveness are used by the 
two international competitiveness indexes: one published by the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) (Schwab, 2010) and the other one by the Institute 
for Management and Development (IMD, 2009). The Global Competitiveness 
Report 2010–2011 of the WEF defines competitiveness as “the set of 
institutions, policies and factors that determine the level of productivity of 
a country” (Schwab, 2010, p. 4).6 The IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbook 
defines competitiveness as “how nations and businesses are managing the 
totality of their competencies to achieve greater prosperity” (IMD, 2009).7  
                                                   
4 See also the argumentation by Flassbeck & Spieker (2011). 
5 See R.Z. Lawrence, “Competitiveness”, Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, Library of 
Economics and Liberty (http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/ 
Competitiveness.html). 
6 The report covers 12 pillars of competitiveness. It includes various indicators, such as 
education and training, technological progress, macroeconomic stability, good 
governance, firm sophistication, market efficiency and public trust in politicians. 
7 The IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbook includes 20 sub-indicators under four main 
dimensions: economic performance, government efficiency, business efficiency and 
infrastructure. In addition to growth and economic performance, IMD’s index also 
considers softer indicators, such as quality of life. 
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Following the second set of definitions of competitiveness, from our 
own understanding, we would define economic/productivity growth as 
one of the most robust indicators of competitiveness. Thus in assessing an 
economy’s competiveness, one should examine those factors that have the 
possibility to enhance productivity. The Europe 2020 strategy correctly 
takes into account that measured GDP growth should not be the only 
policy goal. We agree that measures such as GDP per CO2 emissions and 
income inequality also constitute important measures to capture 
ecologically and socially sustainable economic growth (see also Sen et al., 
2009).  
In our view, a nation’s competiveness refers to its capability to use its 
available resources as efficiently as possible to produce socially and 
ecologically sustainable wealth over the long term, thereby providing a 
sustainable increase in living standards for its citizens. In our opinion this 
is best achieved with appropriate and sufficiently high investment in 
innovation (e.g. business intangibles), human and social capital.  
The qualification with the ‘available resources’ is very important if 
one wants to judge the EU’s performance, given that its available human 
resources have stopped growing. This, together with the financial crisis, is 
also the reason why the implicit Lisbon goal8 of a 3% growth rate in real 
GDP is no longer realistic in the Europe 2020 strategy. Moreover, if one 
looks back over the last decade, one finds that the growth rate in GDP per 
capita has been approximately the same on both sides of the Atlantic, 
although the absolute growth rate of the US economy has been about one-
half of 1% higher. The difference is of course due to the very low rate of 
population growth in the EU. Moreover, since birth rates are lower in the 
EU than in the US, the growth of the working-age population has been 
even lower on this side of the Atlantic (Table 1.1).  
                                                   
8  As a kind of precursor to the Europe 2020 Strategy, the ‘Lisbon Agenda’ was a 
development plan devised by the EU in 2000. Its aim was to make the Europe "the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion", by 
2010.  See European Council (2000). 
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Table 1.1 The demographic outlook for the G-3: Cumulative growth in the 
working-age population by decade (%) 
  1990–2000 2000–10 2010–20 
China 13.3 13.3 1.9 
US 12.3 10.9 3.9 
EU 3.2 3.6 -1.5 
Note: Working-age population constitutes the population aged 15-65. 
Source: Eurostat and UN population projections.  
As a result one finds that growth in the EU in terms of GDP growth 
per working-age population has been slightly higher than in the US. This is 
illustrated in Table 1.2, which shows the cumulative growth of GDP per 
person aged 15-64 over the last decade (10% for the euro area versus 9% for 
the US). Another interesting conclusion to emerge from this table is that 
one should not consider a ‘Japanese decade’ a period of dismal 
performance, since in Japan real GDP per working-age population has 
actually increased more than in Europe or the US. 
Table 1.2 Cumulative growth in real GDP, per person aged 15-64, 2000–10 
(2000 = 100) 
Area Cumulative growth 
US 109 
Japan 116 
Euro area 110 
Source: Own calculations based on IMF data. 
Looking ahead, the differences in demographics on both sides of the 
Atlantic will remain and the absolute growth rate in the working-age 
population will fall further in the EU, as shown in Table 1.1 above. The 
working-age population of the EU is projected to shrink until 2020, albeit 
only slightly (compared with the small positive growth between 2000 and 
2010). This means that the EU will over all probably record even lower 
growth over the next decade than during the previous one and continue to 
experience lower overall growth rates than the US. Table 1.1 also shows 
that the working-age population will decelerate even more sharply in 
China over the next decade (the growth rate falls from about 1.3% per year 
to 0.19%), but given its much lower starting point in terms of GDP per 
capita, the country (along with most other emerging markets) is likely to 
continue to record much higher overall growth rates. 
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1.2 The global context 
When the Lisbon strategy was formulated in 2000, the US appeared (for the 
then EU-15) to be the shining example of a competitive mature economy. 
Its employment rate became the target for the EU for the year 2010 and the 
ambition for the EU was to overtake the US to become “the most 
competitive knowledge economy” in the world. 
Ten years later, the US no longer appears to constitute the best 
example to follow and it is clear that the emerging markets have become 
the key growth pole of the world economy. The ambition of the EU must 
now be reduced from becoming the most competitive economy to ensuring 
that it does not fall back given its deteriorating demographics and the 
weakness of its financial markets.  
This relative decline is apparent in a number of areas. The most 
obvious one is that the share of global GDP of the EU is declining rapidly, 
while that of China and other emerging markets is increasing (Table 1.3). 
Table 1.3 Growth poles in the global economy: Share of world GDP growth* (%) 
 1990-2000 2000-10 2010-20 
EU 15 25 16 
 - Euro area 15 19 9 
Developing Asia 12 23 29 
 - China 8 15 19 
US 41 25 15 
* Measured in PPP. 
Source: IMF (2011). 
Another characteristic of the relative decline of the EU is in the area 
of innovation or at least the expenditure on R&D. Whereas a decade ago 
the EU ran a relatively close second to the US in terms of R&D expenditure, 
this is no longer the case, as China is now on course to overtake the EU and 
by 2020, on present trends, will spend much more in absolute terms (and 
about a similar percentage of GDP). Table 1.4 suggests that by 2020 China 
will spend about 40% more than the EU on R&D if it can maintain its past 
growth rates. The difference would disappear (i.e. the EU would spend as 
much as China in 2020) only if the EU were to really achieve its 2020 target 
of spending 3% of GDP on R&D. 
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Table 1.4 Total R&D spending* by the EU, US and China 
(with projections to 2020) 
 2000 2008 2020 
EU (27 countries) 160 201 264 
US 233 283 356 
China  24 87 368 
Japan 86 107 139 
* At constant 2000 euros (in PPP). 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
The one aspect where the relative decline in the importance of the EU 
is welcome concerns the environment. The share of the EU in global 
emissions is indeed rapidly declining. This is only partially due to the 
efforts of the EU to reduce its own emissions. Still, in reality EU emissions 
have declined by only about 16% relative to the Kyoto Protocol baseline of 
1990. Over the same period the emissions in emerging markets have 
nonetheless increased by a multiple of this value. Table 1.5 shows that in 
the year 2000 the EU still accounted for 19% of global emissions; today this 
value is only 12% and by the year 2020 it will have declined to about 10%. 
By contrast the share of the emerging Asian nations (non-OECD Asia) will 
have increased to over 40% of the world’s total. This implies that the EU’s 
own direct contribution to solving the global climate change problem is on 
course to becoming marginal. 
Table 1.5 Share of world C02 emissions (%) 
 2000 2010 2020 
EU 19 12 10 
US 23 18 15 
Non-OECD Asia countries 17 34 41 
Source: Own calculations based on IEA (2010). 
1.3 The forgotten dimension: Financial markets 
The Europe 2020 strategy makes explicit reference to financial markets, but 
it does not set any specific goals, nor does it contain any concrete measures 
despite the fact that the 2008 global financial crisis and the ongoing debt 
crisis in the euro area should have shown us that financial stability is a 
precondition for growth. Moreover, liberalising financial markets had been 
part of the Lisbon strategy. But the result of capital market liberalisation 
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(and integration) has been disappointing to say the least: R&D investment 
has not increased materially as a share of GDP and the bubble years saw a 
massive misallocation of capital into excessive construction investment in 
the Baltics, Spain and Ireland and excessive consumption in Portugal and 
Greece. There has been therefore a huge misallocation of capital within 
Europe and in particular within the eurozone. Increasing the efficiency of 
the allocation of investment and capital should have been a priority. 
Growth, including growth in employment, will materialise over this 
decade only if financial stability is re-established in the eurozone (which 
accounts after all for over 60% of the EU’s GDP). The drafters of the Europe 
2020 should have taken this prognosis more explicitly into account. 
1.4 Managing relative decline 
Given that the emerging economies, chiefly China, are set to outgrow the 
EU over the next decade by a large margin, it is clear that success for the 
Europe 2020 agenda will be measured not by whether the EU is able to 
maintain a top position in economic league tables, but rather whether it can 
manage relative decline in such a way that the standard of living of the 
greying EU population still increases modestly. 
What are the strategic implications of the more rapid growth in 
emerging markets?  
In principle, the EU should benefit from the strong growth of these 
economies, especially in terms of exports of investment goods. Also, the 
even faster growth of R&D expenditure in countries like China should not 
in principle be a cause of concern, as the economic literature indicates that 
the international spillovers from R&D should be positive. At the same time, 
it seems that the payoff from really path-breaking inventions is rising as the 
size of the global economy grows along with the pool of incremental R&D 
activity. (The greater the number of consumers who can afford a new 
gadget like an iPad, the more the inventor will profit. And the inventor will 
also benefit from the increased availability of software engineers who can 
contribute incremental improvements.) This would suggest that the quality 
of education, especially higher education and research, will in future matter 
even more. The relative absence of EU universities in global rankings is not 
a good sign in this respect. 
Finally, in the area of climate change, the relative decline of the EU 
means simply that action at home will not contribute much to the solution 
of the problem. 
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2. THE TARGET OF INNOVATION 
here is good and bad news in this area if one looks purely at the 
numbers. The good news is that investment in R&D has held up well 
despite the unprecedented depth of the recession and the fact that 
finance for R&D must presumably have become more difficult to obtain 
owing to the financial and banking crises. The bad news is that the EU’s 
investment rate in R&D (as a share of GDP) has been very sluggish for 
more than a decade and that achieving the 2020 target would require a 
significant departure from the longer-term trend (see Figure 2.1 below).  
Figure 2.1 Expenditure on R&D as a % of GDP in EU-27, 2000–09 
 
Source: Own estimations using Eurostat data. 
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Moreover, since fiscal policy is likely to remain under pressure for some 
time it is clear that public expenditure is unlikely to increase significantly. 
This implies that business expenditure, which in any case constitutes the 
largest part of R&D spending, has to rise very strongly over the next 
decade if the EU is to reach the 2020 target. Business R&D expenditure 
would actually have to increase by 80% if the 3% of GDP target is to be 
reached exclusively in this way, because business R&D expenditure now 
accounts for about 1.25% of GDP. It would have to increase to 2.2% of GDP 
in the EU-27 if the GDP shares of public and higher education expenditure 
are to remain constant (as one would expect given the pressure on 
budgets). Figure 2.2 shows graphically what change would be needed to 
reach the intended 3% benchmark in the year 2020. However, there is little 
sign of this happening so far.  
Figure 2.2 Expenditure of R&D as a % of GDP in EU-27—Projection to reach the 
Europe 2020 target  
 
 
Yet the likelihood that the EU will once again miss its own target 
perhaps becomes less relevant if one asks whether R&D is actually the 
proper target for innovation activity. This chapter therefore discusses 
alternative, broader indicators of innovation activities.  
2.1 R&D expenditure – Flawed measure for innovation? 
The importance of innovation for productivity growth has been stressed by 
many classical economic papers (see for example, Solow, 1956; Romer, 
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1990; Grossman & Helpman, 1994; Aghion & Howitt, 1992).9 Thus it is 
reasonable and sound for a competitiveness strategy, such as the Europe 
2020 strategy, to put innovation policies at the centre of its dimensions of 
competiveness. To measure innovation, the Lisbon agenda had already set 
the 3% benchmark of R&D investment in 2000. The Europe 2020 strategy 
(European Commission, 2010a) has agreed on the same benchmark, 
although it has indicated that a broader indicator of innovation should be 
utilised once one becomes available.10 The use of R&D as a sole indicator 
has been criticised as concentrating too much on the manufacturing sector, 
thus leaving out to a large extent the service industry and a large chunk of 
innovation activity within advanced EU economies (see here Tilford & 
Whyte, 2010; Roth et al., 2010).  
But until recently there has not been an indicator available to measure 
this activity. This situation has changed with the official publication of the 
intangible capital dataset11 by the INNODRIVE project (Jona-Lasinio et al., 
2009, 2011; Piekkola, 2011; INNODRIVE, 2011). Its broader set of indicators 
to measure innovation is now available for an EU-27 country sample. This 
set of indicators is based upon an approach by Corrado et al. (2005, 2009) 
and has been applied to several country studies outside the US (Marrano et 
al., 2009; Edquist, 2011; Fukao et al., 2009; Jalava et al., 2007; Roth & Thum, 
2010b). The new measure conceptualises innovation in wider terms by 
specifying innovation as also including: i) software and computerised 
information, ii) scientific and non-scientific R&D and iii) economic 
competencies. Economic competencies are further grouped into the three 
single aspects: i) marketing and advertising investment, ii) investment in 
firm-specific human capital (staff training) and iii) investment in 
organisational capital (organisational efficiency). A thorough description of 
                                                   
9  The papers that have specifically stressed the importance of R&D are those by 
Lichtenberg (1993), Coe & Helpman (1995), Park (1995), Guellec & Van Pottelsberghe 
(2001), Griffith et al. (2004), and Khan & Luintel (2006). Studies emphasising the 
importance of ICT include those by Van Ark et al. (2009) and O’Mahony & Vecchi 
(2003). Most recently, some authors have stressed the importance of intangible capital, 
for instance Corrado et al. (2009), Marrano et al. (2009), Edquist (2011), Fukao et al. 
(2009), Jalava et al. (2007), Van Rooijen-Horsten (2008). 
10 Thus the Europe 2020 strategy already indicates that while sticking to the 3% R&D 
target, it is necessary to develop an indicator that would reflect R&D and innovation 
intensity (European Commission, 2010a, p. 9). 
11  The data can be downloaded from the INNODRIVE website 
(http://www.innodrive.org/).  
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the dataset and the underlying methodology can be found in Jona-Lasinio 
et al. (2009, 2011). Our preferred measure of innovation activity is ‘new 
intangible capital’, which incorporates forms of intangible capital that are 
not included in national accounts. These types of intangible capital are the 
following: architectural design, new financial products, own-account and 
purchased organisational structure of a firm, firm-specific human capital 
(training), branding (advertising), market research and scientific R&D 
(Piekkola, 2011, p. 3 and Jona-Lasinio et al., 2011, pp. 34-54). 
An important feature of the measure is that it does not contain any 
public sector investment, but is based solely on private sector investment. 
Thus, it encompasses the non-farm business sectors c to k, plus o.12 
Figure 2.3 shows the intangible capital investment in new intangible 
capital 13  in the EU-25. 14  Roth (2010) shows that once adding economic 
competencies on top of R&D, this increases innovation activity 
significantly.  
A first observation is that the intensity of investment in all forms of 
new intangible capital varies greatly among the 25 member countries for 
which this measure is available. The highest investment is in new 
intangible capital (without product development in the financial services 
industry) and can be observed in Sweden (10.6% of value added) followed 
by Belgium (9.4%) and the UK (9.02%). France (8.59%) and the Netherlands 
(8.44%) come in fourth and fifth place respectively, followed by Slovenia 
and Finland. The largest economy, Germany, is located in the upper-
middle field of the distribution.  
                                                   
12 In Figures 2.3-2.7 and 2.9 to 2.14, the VA reflects the gross value added for the non-
farm business sectors, excluding real estate activity. 
13 As software has already been included within the national asset boundary, it is not 
included in the concept of new intangible capital (which only incorporates assets that 
have not yet been included within the national asset boundary). 
14 This indicator is only for the EU-25 because the cases of Bulgaria and Romania were 
not analysed owing to the fact that the data used from the INNODRIVE project do not 
include values for gross value added at current basic prices for these two countries. The 
indicator ‘product development in the financial services industry’ has not been 
included in Figure 2.2, as it has become more doubtful whether this indicator should 
still be included in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Furthermore, as in the case of 
Luxembourg, this latter indicator compromises a large bulk of intangibles. Figure A.1 
in the Annex shows the new investment rates in intangible capital when product 
development in the financial services industry is included.  
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The economies that rank poorest overall are the Mediterranean and 
Baltic countries. Among the eight worst-performing countries are all six 
Mediterranean countries and the two Baltic countries, Latvia and 
Lithuania. This is particularly worrisome for economies such as those of 
Italy, Greece or Spain, which all badly need increased economic growth in 
the decade ahead to be able to service their progressively higher debts.  
Figure 2.3 Investment in new intangible capital by businesses in the EU-25 
compared with R&D, 1995–2005 
 
Note: VA represents GVA expanded by intangible capital investment for the non-
farm business sector (c-k+o) excluding real estate activities. 
Source: Own estimations based on INNODRIVE data. 
It is interesting to observe the good position of the UK, as its 
investment in R&D is quite low compared with the two largest continental 
European economies, Germany and France. This fact is less astonishing, 
however, when taking into consideration that the UK has greatly 
specialised in services and knowledge production over the last decades.15 
Thus an indicator such as R&D, which is mostly based on an economy’s 
                                                   
15 As different economies tend to specialise in a variety of industrial sectors (see here 
also Hall & Soskice, 2001), an innovation factor such as R&D, which chiefly depicts the 
innovation within the manufacturing sector, will not be appropriate for the full range 
of European economies, among which some may have specialised in services, IT, 
design, etc.  
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specialisation in manufacturing, seems to be more problematic for those 
economies that have more heavily specialised in innovating in their service 
sectors. Taking a closer look at the UK, a large share of the new intangible 
capital investment seems to be invested in organisational capital.16  
But more importantly, the criterion of 3% of R&D spending is simply 
the wrong measure because it centres on the manufacturing sector, and 
given the global division of labour, in which manufacturing has 
experienced a profound shift towards the developing countries, it is not an 
appropriate measure for service-dominated economies such as those in the 
EU-15, where the share of services in GDP is around several times larger 
than that of manufacturing.17 Therefore, to measure the innovativeness of 
Europe’s service sector and knowledge economies, a broader indicator for 
innovation seems crucial. The Europe 2020 strategy should shift its 
innovation indicator towards a broader measure of innovation. This is 
already foreseen (at least in a footnote in the official documents) and 
should now be implemented given that such a measure is available. 
Figure 2.4 highlights once more the dominance of investment in 
economic competencies over that in R&D. In all countries the investment in 
the three aspects of economic competencies are higher than investment in 
R&D. 
This is less so in R&D-intensive countries, such as the three 
Scandinavian countries Sweden, Finland and Denmark, and the three 
coordinated countries18  Germany, Austria and France. Still, in all other 
                                                   
16 Some of the large variance concerning organisational capital could stem from the 
difficulties of the international comparability of the ISCO88 classification.  
17 Different sources give somewhat different indicators. Eurostat reports that for 2008 
manufacturing contributed 16.5% of total economy-wide value added (GDP), whereas 
services contributed 72%. The so-called EUKLEMS database reports give somewhat 
different results. 
An example of the extent to which manufacturing has been relocated to the emerging 
markets is the manufacturing and sale of the iPod. The manufacturing of the iPod, 
which takes place in China, makes up the smallest fraction of the production of the 
iPod. Most of the costs are hidden in the design and economic competencies, such as 
firm-specific human capital, organisational capital and brand name.  
18 For an introduction to the concept of ‘coordinated countries’, please see Hall & 
Soskice (2001). Contrary to the classification in Hall & Soskice (2001), however, France 
was considered a coordinated country. 
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countries, investment in new intangible capital clearly outweighs the 
investment in R&D.  
Figure 2.4 Investment in R&D vs. economic competencies, 1995–2005 
 
Note: VA represents GVA expanded by intangible capital investment for the non-
farm business sector (c-k+o) excluding real estate activities. 
Source: Own estimations based on INNODRIVE data. 
The key question to explore now is whether the single intangible-
capital aspects are grouping themselves around the R&D activity of 
European economies or whether the other intangible capital dimensions are 
independent from investment in R&D. Figure 2.5 shows a scatter plot of 
R&D investment and investment in firm-specific human capital. The scatter 
plot clarifies that investment in R&D seems to go hand-in-hand with 
investment in firm-specific human capital within an EU-25 country sample. 
The R-square value of 0.4819  indicates a moderately strong association. 
Thus, typically, R&D investments in the market sector of an economy are 
related to the investment of the market sector in firm-specific human 
capital (or staff training). One could conclude that investments in R&D and 
staff training are complementary. The relationship between R&D and firm-
                                                   
19 This value is the highest among all correlations between investment in R&D and the 
other indicators of new intangible capital. 
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specific human capital is strongly driven by the two economies Sweden 
and Finland, in which large investment in R&D is associated with high 
levels of investment in training. The outlier here is Denmark, which invests 
more in training than in R&D.  
Figure 2.5 The relationship between investment in R&D and firm-specific human 
capital, 1995–2005 
 
Note: VA represents GVA expanded by intangible capital investment for the non-
farm business sector (c-k+o) excluding real estate activities. 
Source: Own estimations based on INNODRIVE data. 
But the picture looks somewhat different if one compares the 
investment in organisational capital with R&D investment (Figure 2.6). As 
has already been pointed out by Roth (2010), the investment in 
organisational capital is only weakly associated with investment in R&D. 
As mentioned above, here the UK is a clear outlier in that it invests 
significantly in organisational capital but only moderately in R&D. This is 
largely owing to the own-account spending on managers’ salaries. Hence, 
as proposed by previous studies (e.g. Tilford & Whyte, 2010), these results 
suggest that the UK has put greater emphasis on restructuring its 
organisations, which is more closely related to its innovativeness in the 
services sector.  
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Figure 2.6 The relationship between investment in R&D and organisational 
structure  
 
Note: VA represents GVA expanded by intangible capital investment for the non-
farm business sector (c-k+o) excluding real estate activities. 
Source: Own estimations based on INNODRIVE data. 
2.2 Intangible capital investment  
The national accounting system developed in the West today seems to be 
flawed in several respects. In general it lacks the inclusion of 
environmental, human, health and social capital (Sen et al., 2009). 
Moreover, it seems unable to measure the ongoing shift from economies 
based on traditional, industrial manufacturing towards economies that are 
far more based upon services and knowledge – in general a shift towards 
knowledge economies (Roth, 2010). Van Ark et al. (2009) frame this 
argument another way, stressing that manufacturing goods are becoming 
more and more knowledge-intensive. As already pointed out by Roth 
(2010), if one considers new intangible capital as gross fixed capital 
formation and adds it on top of ICT capital, the investment rate (investment 
as a share of value added) will nearly double in an EU-11 country sample. 
at
be
cy
cz
dk
ee
fi
fr
de
gr
hu
ie
itlv
lt
lu
mt
nl
pl
pt
sk
si
es
se
uk
0
1
2
3
4
 O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l S
tr
uc
tu
re
/V
A
0 1 2 3 4
R&D/VA
THE EUROPE 2020 STRATEGY | 21 
Furthermore, one would also then not observe a steady decline in 
investment rates. Once one takes new intangible capital and ICT capital 
into account, the investment rate steadily increases in the European 
economies (Figure 2.7). 
Figure 2.7 Comparison of business investment in traditional tangible capital, ICT 
and new intangible capital in the EU-13, 1995-2005 
 
Notes: Tangible capital investment excluded residential capital and intangible 
capital excluded product development in the financial services industry. All 
investments are expressed as a percentage of GVA expanded by intangible 
capital investment for the non-farm business sector (c-k+o) excluding real 
estate activities. 
Source: Own estimations based on data from the INNODRIVE Project and 
EUKLEMS database (EUKLEMS: EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity 
Accounts, March 2008 Release, http://www.euklems.net/). The authors 
would like to thank Mary O’Mahony for providing the tangible capital 
input for France and Ireland to the authors. 
The conclusion of Figure 2.7 is clear. The European business sector 
seems to be far better prepared for global competitiveness than is suggested 
by official, national account statistics. If one compares China’s massive 
investments in traditional brick, mortar and machinery capital with the 
investment rate of European businesses, one might strongly conclude that 
European business sectors are falling far behind. But the fact that China is 
investing heavily in traditional capital is just a sign of the phenomenon of 
deeper interconnectedness in global production, with China having taken 
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over a huge part of the world’s manufacturing. Thus, a policy conclusion 
for the most advanced European economies must be to invest more heavily 
in intangible capital, as it is there that they will have to establish the lead if 
they want to be able to increase their living standards and therefore their 
GDP per capita in the coming decades.  
To clarify the argument, Figure 2.8 shows the investment trend in 
traditional capital investment for the EU-4 (Germany, France, Italy and the 
UK) in comparison with the US and China. The figure shows well-known 
facts. China’s capital investment remains constant at an approximate rate of 
40%, whereas the EU-4’s capital investment rate has somewhat declined 
(from 23.4% in 1970 to 18.5% in 2009). Did the investment gap between 
China and the EU-4, which was 16.8% in 1970, widen to 20.5% in 2009? As 
we expect that the EU-4 is investing more greatly in intangible capital, most 
likely the old gap can be evened out significantly once intangible capital 
investment is viewed as gross fixed capital formation. In particular, 
investment rates in the US (which were around 16% in 1970 and 2009) 
should be significantly higher. In fact, they should be twice as high (see 
Nakamura, 2010). 
Figure 2.8 Comparison of investment trends in China, the US and the EU-4 
(France, Germany, the UK and Italy) (%) 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from the PENN WORLD, Tables 6.3. 
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2.3 The relationship between tangible and intangible capital 
investment 
Figure 2.9 depicts the capital investment flows for an EU-25 country sample 
in the year 2005, after adding intangible capital investment on top of 
tangible capital. The average EU-25 investment rate is 28%. Whereas in 
Luxembourg the investment rate in intangibles is already higher than 
investment in tangible capital, in countries like Sweden, the Netherlands 
and the UK, the investment share is approximately the same. Denmark, 
Finland, France and Belgium invest a significant proportion in intangibles, 
while transition, Baltic and Mediterranean countries put the largest share 
into tangible investment.  
Figure 2.9 Tangible vs. intangible capital investment in the EU-25, 2005 (%) 
 
Note: New intangible capital investment excludes investment in product 
development in the financial services industry. VA represents GVA 
expanded by intangible capital investment for the non-farm business sector 
(c-k+o) excluding real estate activities. 
Source: Own estimations based on INNODRIVE data. 
Figure 2.10 shows the relationship between tangible and intangible 
investment in an EU-25 country sample for the year 2005. The scatter plot 
already indicates a negative association between tangible and intangible 
capital investment. 
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Figure 2.10 Relationship between tangible and intangible investment in an EU-25 
sample, 2005 
 
Note: New intangible capital investment excludes investment in product 
development in the financial services industry. VA represents GVA 
expanded by intangible capital investment for the non-farm business sector 
(c-k+o) excluding real estate activities. 
Source: Own estimations based on INNODRIVE data. 
This picture grows more pronounced in an EU-15 country sample 
(Figure 2.11). The significantly negative association between tangible and 
intangible capital highlights that those countries with low levels of 
intangible capital investment tend to have higher levels of tangible capital 
investment (such as Spain and Portugal). Those countries with a low 
investment rate in tangible capital seem to have a higher investment rate in 
intangible capital (such as the UK and the Netherlands). 
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Figure 2.11 Scatter plot of tangible and intangible investment in an EU-15 sample, 
2005 
 
Note: New intangible capital investment excludes investment in product 
development in the financial services industry. VA represents GVA 
expanded by intangible capital investment for the non-farm business sector 
(c-k+o) excluding real estate activities. 
 
As we have seen up to now, it seems that there is a transformation 
taking place in the more advanced and wealthy economies from tangible to 
intangible capital investment. Figure 2.12 shows a scatter plot of the wealth 
of a nation (GDP per capita) and the ratio between the investment levels in 
intangible and tangible capital. It appears that richer countries have a 
higher ratio of investment in intangible to tangible capital. The causality 
could clearly run the other way around, however, such that countries that 
have invested sufficiently in intangible capital have grown faster and 
become richer (for the positive impact on the investment of intangible 
capital on labour productivity growth, see Roth & Thum, 2010b).  
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Figure 2.12 Scatter plot of GDP per capita and the ratio of intangible and tangible 
investment in EU-25, 2005 
 
Note: New intangible capital investment excludes investment in product 
development in the financial services industry.   
Source: Own estimations based on INNODRIVE data and Eurostat data. 
2.4 R&D, intangible capital investment and tertiary education 
The goal of tertiary education and the goal of R&D investment are treated 
quite separately within the EU 2020 strategy. Yet this does not make sense 
if one thinks about how the R&D target is to achieved: more R&D 
expenditure requires more highly qualified personnel, particularly 
engineers for R&D in the usual, narrow sense and other highly qualified 
personnel if one thinks about intangible capital. Indeed, the target of 
innovation cannot be treated separately from the target of education. 
Figure 2.13 clarifies that for a country with a low rate of tertiary graduation, 
it makes no sense to invest 3% of its GDP in R&D, because it will not have 
the capacity to employ the necessary researchers for its R&D investment.  
The case of Italy can be used to illustrate this proposition. With a 20% 
rate of tertiary graduation and 1% spending of R&D over GDP, the policy 
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goal to increase R&D by 2% (from 1 to 3%) for Italy makes no sense as Italy 
plainly lacks an adequate number of academics who would be able to 
absorb the additional spending. Taking the current rate of tertiary 
graduation into account, in Italy an additional increase in R&D spending 
would most likely only result in higher salaries for the existing researchers 
but would not create any benefits/welfare for the total economy. 
Figure 2.13 Relationship between the share of the population having graduated 
from tertiary education (aged 30-34) and business R&D investment 
over gross value added (2005) 
 
Note: VA represents GVA expanded by intangible capital investment for the non-
farm business sector (c-k+o) excluding real estate activities. 
Source: Own estimations based on INNODRIVE data and Eurostat data. 
At the same time, it seems that other institutional variables are 
associated with R&D investment. We would emphasise in particular the 
importance of the general framework that is constituted by the public 
administration. Investment in R&D will be undertaken only if there is an 
efficient government apparatus that protects this investment. That is why 
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we also put among the explanatory variables an indicator of the 
effectiveness of government (from the World Bank Governance Indicators 
dataset). Moreover, we added two additional variables, which might be 
important in explaining where R&D takes place: 
1) The share of manufacturing in GDP (since R&D is mainly done in the 
manufacturing sector), and, 
2) A dummy for Germany and Austria, which is justified by the dual 
education system in these countries. 
The result of the regression analysis is reported in Table 2.1. We find 
that this regression explains over two-thirds of the cross-country variability 
in R&D investment. The share of manufacturing in GDP is highly 
significant and implies that a country whose manufacturing sector is larger 
by, say, four percentage points of GDP also spends 0.2 percentage points 
more of its GDP on R&D. The dummy variable for Germany and Austria is 
also highly significant and implies that both countries spend about half a 
percent of their GDP more on R&D than would otherwise be expected. 
Notably, however, the tertiary graduation rate is not significant in this 
regression, which might be explained by the fact that tertiary graduation 
rates are linked with government effectiveness. 
Table 2.1 Other institutional variables that are associated with R&D investment 
R&D Coefficient Standard Error 
Tertiary graduation rate (15-64 yrs.) 0.01 0.02 
Government effectiveness 1.24*** 0.24 
Manufacturing value added 0.05** 0.02 
Dummy for Austria and Germany 0.54** 0.23 
Constant -1.25* 0.65 
R-square 0.75 
 
 Observations 27 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard errors. 
Sources: Own calculations based on INNODRIVE data and Governance Indicators 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). 
The same picture shown in Figure 2.13 can be detected when 
analysing the relationship between the tertiary graduation rates (at age 30-
34) and the investment in intangible capital in Figure 2.14. Increasing 
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investment in intangible capital should be associated with a higher level of 
tertiary graduates. 
Figure 2.14 Scatter plot of the share of the population having graduated from 
tertiary education (aged 30-34) and investment in intangible capital, 
2005 
 
Note: VA represents GVA expanded by intangible capital investment for the non-
farm business sector (c-k+o) excluding real estate activities. 
Source: Own estimations based on INNODRIVE data and Eurostat data. 
Determinants of investment in intangible capital 
It might be useful to explore other cross-country determinants of 
investment in intangible capital. Preliminary results indicate that the same 
variables that influence R&D also influence intangible capital investment, 
i.e. the strongest influence on intangible investment is the efficiency of the 
government. This makes sense because the return on intangible investment 
is determined largely by the extent to which the regulatory and legal 
environment protects the value of intellectual property, patents, 
trademarks, etc. This suggests that efforts to foster investment in intangible 
capital should not be based on incentives for specific activities, but rather 
aim broadly to improve the efficiency of administration, the judiciary, etc. 
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Preliminary investigations (see, for example, the simple OLS regression 
results below in Table 2.2) have not yet allowed us to solve the puzzle, nor 
clarified the causality between government effectiveness and intangible 
capital investment empirically. It could for instance be that richer countries 
have more efficient governments and a higher investment in intangible 
capital. To shed light on these and other questions, more research needs to 
be conducted on this issue.  
Table 2.2 Other institutional variables that have an impact on intangible capital 
investment 
Intangible capital (no financial service) /VA Coefficient Standard error 
Government effectiveness 4.42*** 0.84 
Tertiary graduation rate (15-64 yrs.) -0.08 0.07 
Manufacturing value added 0.15* 0.09 
Dummy for Austria and Germany -1.93*** 0.67 
Constant 1.73 2.31 
R-square 0.59 
 
Observations 27 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Robust standard errors. VA represents GVA expanded by intangible capital 
investment for the non-farm business sector (c-k+o) excluding real estate 
activities. 
Sources: Own calculations based on INNODRIVE data and Governance Indicators 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). 
2.5 Conclusions 
A number of conclusions can be drawn. First, the Europe 2020 innovation 
benchmark of 3% investment in R&D seems insufficient, as R&D is too 
centred on the manufacturing sector. As the main bulk of activities in 
European economies concern the services sector, one should utilise a 
broader concept of innovation, namely the concept of intangible capital. 
Second, using an index of intangible capital changes the innovation ranking 
among European economies. Countries such as the UK, the Netherlands 
and Belgium, which ranked among the average innovators, are now located 
in the top rankings of innovation. Third, the Mediterranean countries do 
not invest enough in intangible capital. This will pose a serious threat to the 
economies of Italy and Spain in the coming decades. Fourth, after 
accounting for intangible capital as gross fixed capital formation, the 
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investment rates of European economies increase significantly. Overall 
business investment is much higher in those countries that are already 
richer. Fifth, it seems that the existing national accounting framework is not 
capable of measuring the transformation of traditional manufacturing 
economies to service- and knowledge-based economies. Finally, investment 
in R&D and intangible capital requires not only an educated population, 
but also efficient government institutions. 
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3. THE TARGET OF EMPLOYMENT 
3.1 Recent developments  
One of the goals of the Europe 2020 strategy is to increase the employment 
rate of the population aged 20-64 from 69% to 75% by the year 2020. As can 
be inferred from Figure 3.1, the threshold of 70% was reached in 2008 for 
the EU-27. But the recession, owing to the financial crisis in the aftermath of 
the collapse of Lehmann Brothers in mid-September 2008, brought the 
employment rate down to 68.6% in 2010. The fall in employment was fairly 
widespread, but was of course strongest in countries like Spain and 
Ireland, due to the bursting of their extraordinary housing bubbles. 
Figure 3.1 Employment rate of the population aged 20-64 in the EU-27, 2000–10 
(%) 
 
Sources: Own calculations based on Eurostat data, Europe 2020 indicators. 
Given the depth of the recession, the fall in the employment rate was 
actually moderate (and smaller than in the US). There has been much 
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discussion about the extent to which this is due to the ‘shock absorbers’ in 
the social security systems of the EU member countries. Yet the fact that 
employment fell by less than GDP also implies that one should not expect 
too much of a rebound in employment even if the European economies 
were to recover fully from the recession (something that is not yet in sight). 
Figure 3.2 clarifies that the goal of 75% of employment will only be 
achieved after enormous efforts of the European member states, as an 
actual increase of 2.3 percentage points from 2000 to 2010 would now have 
to be followed by an increase of 6.4 percentage points from 2011 to 2020.  
Figure 3.2 Employment rate of the population aged 20-64 in the EU-27, 
2000-20 (%)—Projection to reach the EU2020 target 
 
Figure 3.3 highlights the progress needed to reach the 75% 
employment benchmark for each EU-27 country. Interestingly, the largest 
European economy in the EU, Germany, almost reached the goal of 75% 
already in 2009 and has set itself only the goal of increasing this rate by 2 
percentage points to 77%.20 Since little further progress can be expected 
from this country, one has to look more closely at those countries that have 
                                                   
20 There has been some discussion in the literature about the quality of the jobs created 
in Germany. One view is that many of the new German jobs are part-time jobs and 
constitute temporary employment (see also Pochet, 2010). 
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the largest ‘reserves’ in terms of underutilised labour potential. This is the 
case for the two biggest Mediterranean economies, Italy and Spain. For 
both of them, much more effort is required for these two countries to 
succeed in reaching the Europe 2020 goal of a 75% employment rate. In 
Italy, the employment rate of the population aged 20-64 was 61.1% in 2010 
and would need to rise by 13.9%; in Spain it was 62.5% in 2010 and would 
need to increase by 12.5% to reach the 75% benchmark (or its own target of 
74 %) in 2020. However, Italy does not even have the ambition to reach 
75%, but has set itself the much lower target of 67-69%. 
Figure 3.3 Progress needed to reach the Europe 2020 goal: Distance to the 75% 
employment benchmark for those aged 20-64, 2009 
 
Sources: Own calculations based on Eurostat data, Europe 2020 indicators. 
Why are the employment rates in Italy and Spain so low? A look at 
the participation rates disaggregated by gender reveals that the 
participation of women in the labour force increased substantially in 
Germany, while it has continued to lag behind in Spain and Italy. In detail, 
the participation rate of women is as high as 69.6% in Germany but only 
55.8% in Spain and below 50% (49.5%) in Italy. The difference between the 
German and Italian shares of women in the labour force is thus a 
staggering 20.1%.21  In contrast, the difference between the employment 
rates for men in Germany and Italy is only 7.3%. Moreover, the difference is 
                                                   
21 Although it is most likely in the Italian case that there are more activities hidden in 
black/grey markets (Dell’Anno & Schneider, 2003), on its own this would not be able to 
explain the stark difference between Germany and Italy. 
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strongest for those Italian women who have low skills (less than upper-
secondary education). Only 32.5% of Italian women with below upper-
secondary education are employed. From an economic growth perspective, 
it would be highly important for Italy and Spain to increase both the share 
and skills base of women in the labour force.22 
Although the aggregated trend for the EU-27 in Figure 3.1 above 
shows that there have been slight losses in employment in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis, these losses vary significantly across the individual 
European countries, particularly between the periphery and core European 
economies. Figure 3.4 shows the 11-year trend for the two periphery 
countries Ireland and Spain, which have been hit hardest by the real 
economic decline (due to the bursting of their property bubbles) in rising 
unemployment rates (in Spain increasing from 7.8% in 2007 to 19.5% in 
2010, and in Ireland from 4.3% in 2007 to 13.2% in 2010).  
Figure 3.4 Employment rates of the population aged 20-64 in the peripheral 
countries Spain and Ireland, 1999-2010 (%) 
 
Sources: Own calculations based on Eurostat data, Europe 2020 indicators. 
Because of its construction bubble at the time, Spain managed to 
increase its employment share from 57% in 1999 to nearly 70% in 2007. The 
employment rate then fell back to 62.5% when the bubble burst. In Ireland, 
which had a similar construction boom and bust, the employment rate 
among the population aged 20-64 increased from 68% in 1999 to 74% in 
2007 and then declined in the wake of the financial crisis to 65%.  
                                                   
22 This argument is discussed in more detail in the later section on skills upgrading. 
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The same trend identified for Spain and Ireland holds for the three 
Baltic countries Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Figure 3.5). Employment 
ratios reached levels of higher than 75% in Estonia and Latvia in 2008, only 
to shrink by nearly 10% in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2010. As in 
Spain and Ireland, this development was driven by an asset price bubble.  
Figure 3.5 Employment rates of the population aged 20-64 in the Baltic countries, 
1999-2010 (%) 
 
Sources: Own calculations based on Eurostat data, Europe 2020 indicators. 
In comparison, the trends for the two large European economies 
France and Germany have behaved differently. Whereas France modestly 
increased its employment rate among the population aged 20-64 from 66% 
to 70%, Germany managed to increase it by 8% from 67% in 2004 to 75% in 
2010. Moreover, the employment rate in Germany actually rose in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis (Figure 3.6). This has largely to do with the 
fact that the country has managed to expand its female labour force to 
nearly 70%. Furthermore, a combination of an upgrade in skill levels and 
active labour market reforms (as can be inferred from the tables in the next 
subsection) seems to have been the main reason for the increased 
employment rate in Germany. 
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Figure 3.6 Employment rates of the population aged 20-64 in Germany and 
France, 1999-2010 (%) 
 
Sources: Own calculations based on Eurostat data, Europe 2020 indicators. 
3.2 Achieving a 75% employment rate by upgrading skill levels – 
A thought experiment 
As briefly mentioned above, the best way to increase the employment rate 
in the EU seems to be to raise skill levels. To demonstrate how much could 
be achieved this way, we start by presenting some results for the entire EU-
27 population and then discuss the disaggregation by gender. We later turn 
to specific country cases and end up comparing the European economies 
with the US. 
To illustrate our method, we first analyse what happened during the 
last decade. Table 3.1 shows the changing composition of the EU-27 labour 
force aged 20-64 from 2001 to 2010, during the Lisbon process period. 
Overall, there was an increase in the employment rate of 1.7 percentage 
points from 66.9% to 68.6% from 2001 to 2010. How did this come about? If 
one looks at the employment rates by skill class reported on the right-hand 
side of the table, one sees that they did not change much and in two out of 
three cases they actually fell from 2001 to 2010 (with changes of -1.8%, 0.2% 
and -0.5% respectively for the three segments ‘below upper-secondary’, 
‘upper-secondary’ and ‘tertiary’ education). This suggests that labour 
market reforms had no significant impact on the employment rate on 
average for the EU-27. In contrast to the employment rates, which 
remained relatively stable from 2001 to 2010, a real change can be observed 
in the distribution of skills. The share of the population with below upper-
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secondary education decreased by 7.2%, whereas the population share with 
upper-secondary education increased by 1.2% and the population with 
tertiary education grew by 6.0%. Hence, Table 3.1 reveals that a skills 
upgrade rather than labour market reforms were responsible for the very 
small progress the EU made over the last decade (an increase of only 1.7% 
in the employment rate over ten years).23 
Table 3.1 Education and employment: What has improved since Lisbon 
in the EU-27?  
  Share of population (%)* Employment rates (%)* 
  2001 2010 Change 2001 2010 Change 
Below 
upper-secondary 33.9 26.7 -7.2 55.2 53.4 -1.8 
Upper-secondary 47.4 48.6 1.2 69.7 69.9 0.2 
Tertiary 18.7 24.7 6.0 82.9 82.4 -0.5 
Overall na na na 66.9 68.6 1.7 
*Aged 20-64. 
Sources: Own calculations based on Eurostat data, Europe 2020 indicators. 
Based on these observations, a simple thought experiment can 
demonstrate how large a skills upgrade would be necessary to achieve a 
75% employment rate merely by upgrading the education level of the 
working-age population in the EU-27.  
To make some educated guesses about the employment rate that 
could be reached by 2020, we consider two scenarios for the employment 
rates by skill class: 
i) A desirable scenario is that growth returns and that over time the EU 
reaches the same situation in terms of employment rates by skill class 
it had achieved during the peak of the previous boom, namely 2007. 
We call this scenario ‘return to the boom years’. 
ii) A more realistic scenario might be that the unemployment rates by 
skill class of 2010 actually reflect a permanent situation, given that the 
euro crisis is putting pressure on a number of member states and 
given that the experience from other large financial crises suggests 
                                                   
23 This increase is no indication of the quality of work, which, in fact, has decreased 
steadily (see Pochet, 2010). 
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that the recovery is usually slow and incomplete. We label this 
scenario ‘this time is no different’. 
The next ingredient is an educated guess about the speed of the 
upgrading of skill levels of the working-age population. Given that tertiary 
enrolment rates have considerably increased over the last ten years, it is 
already certain that the skill composition of the EU’s working-age 
population will continue to improve until 2020. By exactly how much is 
difficult to predict, but one useful assumption would be that of ‘business as 
usual’, i.e. that the upgrading observed between 2000 and 2010 will be 
replicated between 2010 and 2020. This looks like a probable outcome.  
Bearing in mind that the 2020 strategy has targets for tertiary 
education and early school leavers, one might also ask what employment 
rate could be achieved if these two targets were to be reached and 
maintained long enough to characterise the entire working-age population. 
That is, 40% would have attained tertiary education with only 10% below 
the upper-secondary level. It would probably take until 2050 to achieve this 
result. 
Table 3.2 How to achieve the Europe 2020 goal of 75% employment – A thought 
experiment 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data.  
The four entries in Table 3.2 show what could be expected under the 
four possible combinations of these scenarios. It is apparent that the 2020 
target of an employment rate of 75% could be reached only if overall 
employment conditions return to those of the boom year 2007 and enough 
time has passed so that the higher graduation rates of the 2020 strategy 
characterise the entire working-age population. Under a ‘business as usual’ 
scenario under which the upgrading of the working-age population 
proceeds over the next ten years, as it has done over the last decade, the 
employment rate would improve somewhat if the boom year conditions of 
2007 return, but this would lift the employment rate only to 72.5%. Should 
the business cycle not improve significantly, the employment rate would 
still somewhat improve from its present level (68.6%) to 70.5%, but the 
    Employment rates by education level 
    Return to boom This time is not different 
Composition of working-
age population by 
education level by 2020 
Business as usual 72.5 % 70.5 % 
2020 targets 
achieved  
 
75.1 % 
 
73.3 % 
 
40 | THE TARGET OF EMPLOYMENT 
Europe 2020 target would clearly be missed. This already suggests that the 
2020 target on employment can be reached only if significant reforms of 
labour markets are undertaken.  
3.3 Disaggregation by gender – Does it make a difference?  
The calculations so far, however, were based on aggregated numbers. As 
mentioned above, undereducated women have the lowest employment 
rates. This suggests that it might be useful to disaggregate our calculations 
by gender. The results in Table 3.3 confirm our assumption. 
Table 3.3 Education and employment of women in the workforce: What has 
improved since the Lisbon process the EU-27? 
  Share of population (%)* Women/men 
Employment rates (%)* 
Women/men 
  2001 2010 Change 2001 2010 Change 
Below 
upper-secondary 36.3/31.5 27.3/26.1 -9.0/-5.4 43.1/69.2 43.2/64.1 0.1/-5.1 
Upper-secondary 45.6/49.1 47.0/50.3 1.4/1.2 62.6/76.3 63.8/75.6 1.2/-0.7 
Tertiary 18.1/19.4 25.7/23.6 7.6/4.2 78.6/86.9 79.2/85.9 0.6/-1.0 
Overall na na na 58.0/76.0 62.1/75.1 4.1/-0.9 
*Aged 20-64.  
Sources: Own calculations based on Eurostat data, Europe 2020 indicators. 
A skills upgrade among the female population in the European 
labour force turns out to be more effective than among the male 
population. Whereas in 2010, women with an educational attainment of 
below upper-secondary education had a typical employment rate of 
approximately 43% (thus less than the total value of 53% in Table 3.1 and 
the value of 64% for men), the employment rate increases substantially by 
20.6% (from 43.2 to 63.8%) once women have attained upper-secondary 
education. It rises further by 15.4% (from 63.8% to 79.2%) once they have 
received tertiary education. The increase of 15.4% is still significantly 
higher than the values of 12.5% and 10.3% for the male population. Overall 
the largest increase in the employment rate would be achieved by a skills 
upgrade among women in the population from below upper-secondary to 
upper-secondary education. This is exactly what has occurred between 
2001 and 2010. Table 3.3 clarifies that the 9 percentage points of skills 
upgrade from below upper-secondary education was responsible for the 
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overall increase in the employment of women of 4.1 percentage points over 
this period (compared with a fall of almost 1 percentage point for men). 
One might now wonder whether this argument also holds for the US. 
As can be inferred from Figure 3.7, the same large gap between below 
upper-secondary and upper-secondary education can be detected in the 
US. The similarity between the EU and the US, both across skill classes and 
over time, is actually quite astonishing. In many cases the dark grey curve, 
which indicates the values for the EU, is above the US curve, depicted in 
light grey. 
Figure 3.7 Comparison of typical employment rates of women* in the US and EU 
 
*Aged 20-64.  
Note: EU-19 countries include: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
Source: OECD Unemployment Outlook 2005–2009. 
3.4 The US and the EU – Where do the differences lie? 
Table 3.4 compares the shares of the population (aged 25-64) in the EU with 
that of the US in terms of education and employment. It is quite clear how 
the US manages to maintain a higher employment rate than the EU-27. The 
main difference can be found in the skills composition of the labour force. 
Whereas the US has managed to reduce the share of the population with 
below upper-secondary education to 5.5% and 6.9% for women and men 
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respectively, the EU still has shares of 30.8% and 27.9%. While the US has 
achieved tertiary graduation rates of 41.7% and 38.7% respectively, the EU 
has only achieved tertiary graduation rates of 23.8% and 23.3%. Thus the 
difference between the employment rates in the US and EU is patently due 
to the difference in the skills composition of their labour forces. 
Table 3.4 Comparison of education and employment between the EU and US, 2007 
  Share of population (%) Women/men* 
Employment rates (%) 
Women/men* 
  EU-27 US EU-19 US 
Below 
upper-secondary 30.8/27.9 5.5/6.9 45.4/70.4 45.4/69.2 
Upper-secondary 45.4/48.8 52.8/54.4 67.6/81.2 67.6/79.7 
Tertiary 23.8/23.3 41.7/38.7 81.9/88.8 78.1/89.1 
Overall na na 63.6/79.9 69.2/83.5 
*Aged 25-64. 
Note: EU-19 countries include: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
Sources: Own calculations based on Eurostat data, Europe 2020 indicators, OECD 
Employment Outlook and US Census Bureau.  
We have argued that a skills upgrade rather than labour market 
reforms will increase the EU’s employment rate and we have confirmed 
our hypothesis using an aggregated EU-27 country sample. Does this now 
imply that labour market reforms are not achieving higher employment 
rates? It certainly does not imply this for the individual countries within 
the EU. A simple comparison between the two countries Spain and 
Germany in Table 3.5 exemplifies the underlying differences among the 
various economies in the EU. Whereas in Spain 46.6% of the population 
had below upper-secondary education in 2010, in Germany only 15.3% 
were left with that level. Spain also had a notably smaller share of citizens 
with upper-secondary education (23.6%) compared with Germany (60.2%). 
What is even more important concerning the argument about a skills 
upgrade and labour market reforms is the fact that Germany’s overall gain 
of 5.8% in employment largely stems from successful labour market 
reforms. While in Spain the typical employment rate of the population 
share with below upper-secondary education fell by 3.8% (owing to the 
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burst of the Spanish property bubble in the midst of the financial crisis), in 
Germany it grew by 2.8%. Furthermore, in Germany the typical 
employment rates for upper-secondary and tertiary education increased.  
Table 3.5 Education and employment in Spain and Germany: What has improved 
in the EU-27? 
  Share of population (%) Spain/Germany* 
Employment rates (%) 
Spain/Germany* 
  2001 2010 Change 2001 2010 Change 
Below upper-
secondary 56.7/18.3 46.6/15.3 -10.1/-3.0 56.1/53.2 52.3/56.0 -3.8/2.8 
Upper-secondary 19.8/59.9 23.6/60.2 3.8/0.3 61.3/70.0 63.7/74.9 2.4/4.9 
Tertiary 23.5/21.8 29.8/24.5 6.3/2.7 77.0/83.2 77.6/86.7 0.6/3.5 
Overall na na na 62.0/69.1 62.5/74.9 0.5/5.8 
*Aged 20-64. 
Sources: Own calculations based on Eurostat data, Europe 2020 indicators. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Several conclusions can be drawn. First, a skills upgrade in the EU seems 
key to fostering higher employment rates. Labour market reforms might be 
successful, as in the case of Germany, but in an aggregated analysis they do 
not seem to have had a significant impact in terms of increasing 
employment on average for the EU-27. Second, the (small) employment 
increase achieved from 2001 to 2010 seems to have been driven to a large 
extent by a skills upgrade of women in the labour force from below upper-
secondary to upper-secondary education. The difference in employment 
rates for women between those with below upper-secondary and upper-
secondary education is particularly large. This suggests that Europe’s main 
employment potential appears to be in the (so far underemployed) female 
labour force of the two large Mediterranean economies Spain and Italy. 
These economies and Europe per se would profit greatly if they were to 
achieve a substantial skills upgrade of the women in their labour forces. 
Third, before the big recession, the US employment rate was higher than 
that of the EU because the US had already largely achieved the 2020 targets 
on education.  
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4. THE TARGET OF EDUCATION 
s discussed earlier, education seems a crucial prerequisite not only 
for innovation but also for the employment rate, here in particular 
a skills upgrade of women in the workforce with lower educational 
qualifications. But what makes skilled workers so special? The basic idea is 
that technology is biased in favour of skilled workers and against the less 
skilled ones in as much as it complements the former and substitutes the 
latter. In other words, technological progress tends to increase the demand 
for skilled labour and decrease the demand for less-skilled tasks. This is 
called “skill-biased technological change”.24 And it is even truer for young 
educated persons who absorb new technologies easier and more quickly.  
Therefore, the Europe 2020 strategy has rightly put the topic of 
education in a very prominent place. That education is vital for economic 
growth has been empirically proven by extensive studies.25 In more detail, 
the Europe 2020 strategy has envisaged a tertiary graduation rate of 40% 
among the population aged 30-34 in the EU-27. As already pointed out by 
Roth & Thum (2010a) and as can be inferred from Figure 4.1, the two large 
                                                   
24 The literature is vast. See for example Golding & Katz (2007, 2008), Acemoglu (1998), 
and Autor et al. (1998).  
25  Although some studies question the significantly positive relationship between 
human capital and economic growth (e.g. Pritchett, 2001), a majority of the empirical 
results support a positive relationship between the levels of education and economic 
growth (Barro, 1991; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Krueger & Lindhal, 2001; Bassanini & 
Scarpetta, 2001). Recent research argues for example that the findings of non-positive 
relationships between education and economic growth are mostly due to poor data 
quality (De la Fuente & Doménech, 2006); thus, when utilising high-quality data, a 
robust, positive relationship between education and growth can be established. The 
positive relationship can be replicated not only using quantitative data like average 
years of schooling, but also using qualitative data from the PISA tests (Hanushek & 
Wößmann, 2007). 
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economies Germany and Italy will most likely not be able to achieve the 
goal of a 40% tertiary graduation rate, at least not without a massive drop 
in quality among the new tertiary graduates. More specifically, Italy would 
need to double its graduation rate to meet the target of 40%. It is thus not 
surprising that its own national target is only 26-27%, which could require 
only an improvement of about 25-30% in the graduation rate. Germany 
would have to increase its graduation rate by 10.2 percentage points, or by 
about one-third (comparable to the Italian national target). Other countries, 
e.g. Austria and Greece, would require a similar increase. For further 
details on national targets, see Table A.1 in the Annex. 
But how easily will the EU-27 reach the goal of an overall tertiary 
graduation rate? As clarified in Figure 4.2, on current trends the target 
should be within reach by the year 2020. Since the EU-27 has managed to 
increase its graduation rate from 2000 to 2010 by 11.2%, it should manage 
to increase it further by 6.4% in the same ten-year period from 2011 to 2020.  
Figure 4.1 Percentage of tertiary educational attainment by those aged 30-34 in the 
EU-27 (2010) 
 
Sources: Own calculations based on Eurostat data, Europe 2020 indicators. 
While correctly putting emphasis on a quantitative educational 
benchmark (as done by the European Commission with its 40% target), 
putting the stress solely on the quantitative side of education seems too 
narrow. That is why Gros & Roth (2008) have proposed to construct a 
composite indicator that incorporates the quantity and the quality of 
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education. Figure 4.3 shows such an updated composite indicator with data 
from the latest PISA study.26  
Figure 4.2 Percentage of tertiary educational attainment by those aged 30-34 in the 
EU-27, 2000-20(%)—Projection to reach the EU 2020 target 
 
Figure 4.3 Composite indicator incorporating quantitative and qualitative 
educational indicators 
 
Source: OECD (2009) and PISA 2010 – Data on the quantitative indicator from 2007 
and the qualitative indicator from 2009. 
                                                   
26 See for instance, “OECD Programme for International Student Assessment”, on the 
OECD’s website (http://www.oecd.org/document/61/0,3746,en_32252351_32235731_ 
46567613_1_1_1_1,00.html).  
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As highlighted earlier by Gros & Roth (2008) European economies 
rank behind the three OECD countries South Korea, Canada and Japan. 
Within the EU-15 countries, Germany, Austria, Portugal and Italy are all 
situated in the lower third of the distribution. The tertiary graduation rates 
are low and the PISA test results are average or worse. One has to point out 
once more that Italy’s poor educational performance 27  is especially 
worrisome. As shown by Roth & Thum (2010a), a similar picture appears 
when observing just the engineering students and PISA results in science. 
Two criticisms about such a composite indicator come to mind.  
First, one might question whether the OECD statistics are comparing 
apples with oranges, if in certain countries a tertiary degree is required for 
qualifications that in other countries are covered by vocational training (as 
is done, for example, under the ‘dual system’ in Germany and Austria). 
Would not the inclusion of vocational training fill the gap between 
Germany and Austria on the one hand, and the rest of the European and 
OECD countries, on the other? Would it not fill the gap towards achieving 
the 40% benchmark of tertiary graduation among the population aged 30-
34?  
Opinions on this issue are sharply divided. For example, the report 
by Zimmerli (2009) argues that classical manufacturing is likely to become 
more strongly dominated by scientific and knowledge-based applications, 
with science concentrating more on practicability. The primary argument is 
against a bright future for the dual system in Germany and Austria; 
however, it should take into account the links to the global chain of labour 
specialisation. Manufacturing and incremental innovation will clearly be 
overtaken by the emerging countries China, India, Brazil and others. These 
countries offer plenty of cheap labour and an increase of salaries towards 
Western levels will probably take some decades. From this time onwards 
most manufacturing (specialised and non-specialised) will still be a lot 
cheaper in those countries than in the highly developed economies. To 
secure the current European social model with its significant redistribution 
through the welfare-state mechanisms, European economies have to slowly 
modify their societies and economies towards more knowledge-driven 
production and services. The knowledge-driven production of the future 
will be much more dependent on the intellectual abilities of the workforce. 
                                                   
27 In Italy one has to clearly differentiate between the northern and southern regions. In 
contrast to the northern regions, in Italy’s southern regions, low levels of social capital 
are associated with low levels of educational performance. 
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Investment in longer-term training of the workforce and building up higher 
intellectual capabilities within the framework of university education 
(hence stronger theoretical capabilities are needed) seems one of the best 
ways to secure future economic wealth.  
This view of Europe’s future wealth being largely dependent on 
further significant investments in intangible capital and in particular the 
intellectual abilities of the workforce is only adopted half-heartedly by 
national and European policy-makers. Being occupied with the daily tasks 
of managing the existing societal and economic structures, policy-makers 
and their advisers continually underestimate and underinvest in intangible 
capital. One fine example of the above is the manner in which the German 
and Austrian governments have reacted to their inability to meet the 40% 
graduation rate among the population aged 30-34. Although rightly 
pointing out that their vocational training does not appear to be included in 
the statistics on tertiary education (see also De La Fuente & Doménech, 
2006, who attribute the highest stock of human capital to Germany once 
accounting for its vocational training), the very practical solution put 
forward by the German and Austrian governments to meet the 40% 
benchmark seems dubious at best. As both governments anticipated that 
they would not be able to meet the 40% benchmark, they simply changed 
the statistical classifications to reflect that they have already met the target. 
In an annex to an official publication (see European Commission, 2011a), 
both governments have added the ISCED classification 4a on top of the 
ISCED classification 5 and with the result that both countries have now 
already reached the educational benchmark of 40%.  
Austria and Germany of course have a point in highlighting the 
importance of the dual system. But it seems questionable whether it is wise 
to just change a key indicator. This risks undermining the entire Europe 
2020 benchmarking exercise in the sense that such an exercise requires a 
common statistical framework and set of indicators. Although the ISCED 
classifications will most likely be altered in the coming years,28 it would 
seem preferable for Germany and Austria to stick to comparable indicators. 
This would then force these two countries to argue their case (namely that 
the dual system is equivalent to tertiary education). Having to argue their 
                                                   
28 See article on the UNESCO Institute for Statistics website, “ISCED: International 
Standard Classification of Education”, UNESCO, Montreal 
(http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-standard-classification-
of-education.aspx). 
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case might actually be useful for them because it would force them to look 
closely at the performance of their education systems and to properly 
analyse their deficiencies, for example in terms of the performance of 
secondary students and the relatively low levels of tertiary graduate 
students. In particular one should ask whether the specific human capital 
created by the dual system is equivalent to the more general set of 
knowledge imparted by tertiary education. The latter might become more 
important, given the rapid changes occurring in the global economy.  
The second criticism about our composite indicator is that it does not 
take into account the issue of the quality of tertiary education, but simply 
the quality of secondary education (as it uses PISA test results). A 
composite indicator that takes into consideration not only tertiary 
graduation rates but also the quality of universities would have been 
preferable. Some indicators of the quality of education exist, but not for 
tertiary education, e.g. in the PISA study for secondary education. For this 
reason, Roth & Thum (2010a) have started to construct a composite 
indicator based on the tertiary education rate and the Academic Ranking of 
World Universities. 29  Something along these lines could usefully be 
incorporated in the 2020 strategy. 
4.1 Demand and supply of the highly skilled 
We have shown that the employment rates for individuals with higher 
levels of education are higher than for those with lower skills. Yet is there 
not a danger that in the future there might simply be too many university 
graduates around who might have to accept jobs for which their 
qualifications are not useful or for which they are overqualified? 
Recent work suggests that this should not be the case as the demand 
for highly skilled workers seems to be increasing all the time. Table 4.1 
shows the results of a projection of labour demand by skill levels by the 
European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, as reported 
in a special CEPS study on medium-term employment challenges for the 
Metemplis project (Begg et al., 2010). 
 
                                                   
29  Refer to website on Academic Ranking of World Universities 2011, 
ShanghaiRanking.com (http://www.arwu.org/ARWU2009.jsp). 
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Table 4.1 Labour demand by skill level (as a % of total) 
 1996 2001 2006 2010 2015 2020 est. 
Low 32.9 27.0 26.2 23.6 20.8 18.2 
Medium 46.2 49.9 48.6 49.5 49.9 50.1 
High 20.9 23.0 25.3 27.0 29.3 31.7 
Source: Begg et al. (2010).  
This study arrived at the conclusion that the demand for the highly 
skilled is increasing trendwise (between 1996 and 2010, it grew from 21% to 
27% of the workforce) and is projected to rise even further to 2020, as 
shown in Table 4.1. It is interesting that the demand for medium-skill levels 
is projected to be constant at about 50% of the total. Meanwhile, the 
demand for low skills and for high skills trade places between 1996 and 
2020: whereas the demand for low skills made up about 32% of the total in 
1996, its share is projected to fall to about 18% by 2020; during the same 
period the demand for high skills should increase from about 21% to 32% 
of the total. This alone suggests that there is little danger of an oversupply 
of university graduates resulting from the 2020 target in this area. 
This view is confirmed in the study, which compares labour supply 
and demand. It concludes that there was an excess supply of low-skilled 
and an under-supply of highly skilled labour at the time the Lisbon 
strategy was formulated. Still, the degree of mismatch was considerably 
reduced from 2000 to 2007. As a result of the projected further increase in 
needs and the limited number of inflows into the labour force of more 
highly educated, new generations, an approximate overall balance between 
need and supply should be maintained. Table 4.2 (also drawn from the 
Metemplis project) suggests that a small remaining oversupply of low-
skilled workers will remain coupled with a potentially continuing, small 
shortage of medium-skilled workers and an approximate balance for the 
highly skilled.  
Table 4.2 Supply of labour by skill level (as % of projected and estimated needs)  
 2000 2007 2013 2020 
Low 120.7 117.1 111.3 106.8 
Medium 100.7 105.3 102.8 96.6 
High 91.8 98.8 104.2 100.8 
All 104.3 106.7 105.1 99.8 
Source: Begg et al. (2010).  
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As an aside, it should be noted that even if the overall degree of 
mismatch of skills is considerably reduced over the coming decade, the 
total gross, labour market movements from 2006 to 2020 would not only 
represent a strong shift towards a more knowledge-intensive economy, but 
also a total gross, labour market transition concerning some 100 million 
jobs – or more than 8 million per year. It should also be noted that this 
latter figure does not include the transitions from one job to another within 
a given category of workers and occupations. Consequently, the total 
volume of movements in the labour market during this period can be 
assumed to be significantly higher than the gross transition of 8 million per 
year, amounting to an annual transition of about 10% of the total labour 
force.  
Furthermore, whereas according to these very tentative estimates the 
overall shortage of skilled qualifications seems likely to be absorbed, this in 
no way excludes the possibility that there will remain a lack of scientists 
and engineers.  
4.2 Quantity and quality of education revisited 
Figure 4.4 shows data from the latest Times Higher Education World 
University Rankings of 2010–2011. The ranking utilises 13 separate 
indicators, ranging from teaching and research to knowledge transfer. The 
ranking clarifies the outstanding role of the US when it comes to its higher 
education facilities: 15 US universities rank among the ‘top 20’ and 72 US 
universities rank among the ‘top 200’ world universities. The US is 
followed by the UK, which has 29 universities in the top 200. The UK is 
then followed by Germany, with 14 universities in the top 200; Germany’s 
best university, the University of Göttingen, is ranked in 43rd place. Quite 
astonishingly, in fourth place is the Netherlands, with 10 universities. Also 
to our surprise, although it is the fourth largest economy in Europe, Italy 
does not even appear in the ranking, lacking a single university in the top 
200 universities of the world. The world’s second largest economy, China, 
ranks in seventh place, with 6 universities among the top 200; its best 
university, Peking University is ranked in 37th place.  
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Figure 4.4 Number of institutions in the top 200  
 
Source: The Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2010–2011, Times 
Higher Education, London. 
Figure 4.5 compares the number of universities ranking among the 
top 200 in the US with the countries of the EU, Asia, Oceania (Australia and 
New Zealand), Africa and South America. It becomes apparent that the EU 
is now leading the ranking with 75 universities in the top 200. The EU is 
followed by the US and the Asian countries. A small group is located in 
Oceania, and almost none in Africa and South America. The chart 
illustrates that there will be a new axis of innovation between the EU, US 
and Asia. The EU’s lead in the ranking has to be interpreted with care, 
however, as the European economies have not yet been able to truly 
establish a European research area (ERA) (see Van Pottelsberghe, 2008 and 
Paasi, 2010). The US has successfully established a research area and the 
degree of cooperation and specialisation is far higher than in the ERA. Thus 
it is most likely that the US will continue to be the most succesful economy 
in future decades owing to the excellence of its research facilities. The 
innovative power of US research facilities will not only be used to maintain 
the country’s inventiveness in the military sector but also in information 
technology. As such, the US economy will be able to continue to write 
economic success stories like those of Microsoft, Apple, Google and 
Facebook. To a great extent this is attributable to the clearly outstanding 
performance of the higher education facilities in the US. Without an 
adequate consolidation of the European research area, European economies 
will not be able to increase productivity in the way the US has through its 
higher education/research facilities.  
01020
304050
607080
Finland South A
frica Norwa
y
New Ze
aland Egypt Singap
ore Ireland Turkey Belgium Spai
n Austria Denma
rk Taiwan South K
orea Hong K
ong France Japan Switze
rland Swede
n China Austra
lia Canada Nether
lands Germa
ny UK US
THE EUROPE 2020 STRATEGY | 53 
Figure 4.5 Number of institutions in the top 200 by region  
 
Source: The Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2010–2011, Times 
Higher Education, London. 
We turn now to construct a composite indicator incorporating the 
quantity and quality of educational performance among the world 
economies in the EU, US and emerging countries. As there is no possibility 
for comparing the US, the EU and China with data from either the OECD 
or Eurostat, we use the newly updated dataset from two scholars, Barro & 
Lee (2010). Although the data differ significantly from Eurostat and OECD 
data, we decided to use this dataset because it is, to our knowledge, the 
only one that allows such an international comparison.  
Figure 4.6 shows a composite index of the population aged 30-34 in 
terms of the attainment of tertiary education. The raw data is from the 
Barro-Lee dataset, which provides full data on educational attainment for 
the population aged 15 and over age 25. Combining the Times Higher 
Education World University Rankings 2010–2011 and the Barro-Lee 
dataset, our analysis tries to obtain a composite indicator consisting of a 
quantitative and a qualitative indicator.30  In contrast to the number of 
                                                   
30 We constructed weights by the percentage in the Top 20, Top 100 and Top 200 
rankings. Each weight was multiplied by the percentage of the population aged 30-34 
who completed a tertiary degree. Each value was then divided by the weight of the 
population of each selected country or region to proxy for the total number of 
universities in a country. This measure was then scaled to 100. 
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institutions in the top 200, where the US plays a leading role in the world, 
our analysis leads to a different result. When weighting for the overall 
population to proxy for the total number of universities within a country 
and taking into account the tertiary graduation rate among the population 
aged 30-34, the UK has the best performance among all countries. The US 
ranks in second place. The reason the EU-15 performs worse than the US or 
the UK stems from the fact that the EU-15 has relatively fewer institutions 
in the top 20 and top 100 compared with the US. Moreover, although it is 
the best-performing eurozone country in the rankings, Germany lags far 
behind the US and the UK, because of its low rate of tertiary graduation 
and low university ranking. It is not hard to understand why China ranks 
in the bottom position in our analysis.31 China has the largest population of 
in the world, but more importantly, it is the small number of excellent 
universities that puts China in last place, which can be concluded from the 
small number of institutions in the rankings. 
Figure 4.6 Composite index of tertiary educational attainment by those aged 30-34 
 
Sources: The Times Higher Education (THE) World University Rankings 2010–2011, 
Times Higher Education, London; Barro & Lee (2010). 
                                                   
31 This is somehow different in the case of Shanghai, which performed best in the 
newest PISA test – see Figure A.2 in the annex of this report. 
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4.3 Conclusions 
In drawing conclusions, it is first clear that the Mediterranean countries, 
notably Italy, have to invest more in improving their tertiary graduation 
rates. Second, Germany and Austria have to become aware of the fact that 
the dual system might have to be substituted with a more scientifically-led 
system for knowledge creation, best embedded within the framework of 
today’s tertiary education. To be able to achieve this large increase of 
tertiary training, the German and Austrian governments should radically 
increase their spending on the university systems to enable them to 
maintain the future wealth of their economies. Without a fast and radical 
reformation of their university systems, both nations will suffer significant 
losses in welfare in the upcoming decades. Third, the ERA has to be made 
into a reality. Without a functioning ERA, the bulk of excellent universities 
throughout Europe will never be able to create the same synergy effect as 
has been done in the US. Without a functioning ERA, Europe as a whole 
will suffer significant welfare losses in the future. Fourth, European 
universities have to become excellent. The fact that the best German 
university ranks 43rd among the top 200 and that 15 out of the 20 best 
universities are located in the US illustrates the great threat posed by 
Europe’s ignorance of the much-needed reforms of higher education. Fifth, 
China still seems to play a minor role when it comes to the quality of its 
universities. But as China – unlike many other countries (notably in Latin 
America and Africa) – has understood the key role of education, it can be 
presumed that it will not take long for it to achieve a higher quality. If 
China succeeds in attaining excellence in its university system, it will be 
possible for the country to shift from the mastery it has achieved in 
incremental innovation towards radical innovation.  
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5. THE TARGET OF SOCIAL COHESION 
 first observation is that the 2020 indicator of social cohesion – 
namely the population at risk of poverty or exclusion (defined 
below in Box 5.1) – actually improved somewhat in 2009. This is 
surprising given that the EU has experienced an unprecedented recession 
and a sharp increase in unemployment. Figure 5.1 shows the steady 
improvement in the 2020 indicator for social cohesion. The official statistics 
imply that over 10 million citizens have been lifted out of poverty or 
exclusion between 2005 and 2009. The reason for this steady improvement 
is due to the rapid decline of persons in poverty or exclusion within the ten 
transition countries, in particular within Poland (6.6 million people less in 
poverty or exclusion). One reason must surely be that Poland was little 
affected by the financial and economic crisis (it kept growing in 2009, 
compared to massive drops in GDP in the large EU-15 economies of 
Germany, France, Italy, UK and Spain). 
Furthermore, according to the individual country goals depicted in 
the progress report on Europe 2020 (see Table A.1) and as depicted in the 
projections in Figure 5.1 for the sum of the 10 transition countries, the 
overall goal of the transition countries is a further reduction of 
approximately 3.5 million of its citizens who face either poverty or 
exclusion. The remaining improvement of 16.6 million citizens (to reach the 
target of 20 million) would then have to be achieved within the old member 
countries (plus Malta and Cyprus). The official target for this group is (up 
to now) only a reduction in poverty of approximately 7.2 million (see Table 
A.1). However, between 2005 and 2009, this group has recorded slightly 
increasing poverty and exclusion. Even this target might thus be difficult to 
reach. Moreover, the sum of all the identifiable national targets amounts to 
only 10.7 million, little more than one-half of the target for the entire EU. 
It thus seems very difficult to reach the overall 2020 target.  
A
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Figure 5.1 The 2020 target: Persons at risk of poverty or exclusion in the EU-27, 
2005-20 (projection according to EU 2020 and national targets) 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
A few specific cases can illustrate the challenges ahead. Table 5.1 
shows the evolution of poverty or exclusion reduction/improvement in 
four countries – Italy, Poland, Germany and Austria – in comparison to the 
EU-27. Whereas Italy, Austria and Germany actually were facing increasing 
poverty or exclusion rates, Poland successfully lifted out 6.6 million citizens 
from poverty or exclusion (according to the data provided by Eurostat). 
The case of Italy most strongly clarifies the discrepancy between the 2020 
target of a reduction of 2.2 million and the actual result over the last years 
in which there was an actual increase in poverty or exclusion.  
Table 5.1 Evolution of persons at risk of poverty or exclusion in selected countries 
and EU-27, 2005-09 (thousands of persons) 
Country Diff. 2005-09 Per year EU 2020 target 
EU-27 10,173 2,543.25 20,000 
Germany  -1,185 -296.25 330 
Ireland -112 -28.00 186 
Spain -607 -151.75 1,400-1,500 
France -28 -7.00 1,600 
Italy -214 -53.50 2,200 
Austria -37 -9.25 235 
Poland 6,626 1,656.50 1,500 
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One has to keep in mind, however, that the last few years might not 
be typical because of the unprecedented recession in 2008-09. It remains to 
be seen to what extent a sustained recovery will on its own lead to a 
significant improvement. Unfortunately, it is not possible to check how 
much past recessions have affected the number of persons at risk of 
poverty or exclusion because this indicator is not available for most 
countries prior to 2005. 
Observing the rapid reduction of poverty or exclusion in Poland, one 
might be tempted to ask whether a continued reduction of poverty in the 10 
new member countries would be sufficient to reach the target of 20 million. 
Table 5.2 assumes that EU-10 countries will further reduce their poverty or 
exclusion rates until their average poverty or exclusion rate evens out at the 
same level as EU-17 (21%) countries. If this were reached, approximately 
9.7 million citizens would have escaped poverty or exclusion. However, 
such a full catching up in one decade is highly unlikely and, as mentioned 
above, EU-10 countries have actually set themselves much less ambitious 
targets, affecting a total of only 3.5 million citizens. 
How could the overall target of 20 million then be reached? As 
detailed above, the remainder would have to come from the older member 
states which would require a strong recovery and unprecedented success in 
the fight against poverty or exclusion. (We discuss later in this chapter 
which avenues might be the most efficient.)  
Table 5.2 Potential reduction of persons at risk of poverty or exclusion 
in the EU-10, 2009 
Country groups % at risk Number at risk Total population 
EU-10 0.30 30,980,000 102,135,757 
Euro area (17 countries) 0.21 82,740,000 397,569,739 
European Union (27 countries) 0.23 113,720,000 499,705,496 
EU-10 (same percentage as EU-17) 0.21 21,255,925 102,135,757 
 
Overall one has to point out that the 2020 strategy has mostly 
abandoned the aim of reducing disparities among member countries, given 
that it just adds the number of persons in a situation defined as being at 
risk of poverty or exclusion and given that one sub-indicator is measured 
relative to national benchmarks (relative to the national median wage) (see 
Box 5.1). In this chapter we thus start by discussing the nature of indicators 
of social cohesion. 
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Box 5.1 Indicator for the population at risk of poverty or exclusion  
As defined by Eurostat, the indicator for the population at risk of poverty or 
exclusion corresponds to the sum of persons who are either: 
• at risk of poverty, 
• severely materially deprived or 
• living in households with very low work intensity. 
In the case of intersections between the three sub-indicators, such a 
person is counted only once. 
The at risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers (total, women and 
men) is specified as the share of persons with an equivalent disposable 
income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the 
national median equivalent disposable income after social transfers. 
Severely materially deprived persons are defined as the share of the 
population experiencing at least four out of nine material deprivation items 
in the ‘economic strain and durables’ dimension. The nine items considered 
are: 1) arrears on mortgage or rent payments, utility bills, hire purchase 
instalments or other loan payments; 2) incapacity to afford paying for one 
week’s annual holiday away from home; 3) incapacity to afford a meal with 
meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day; 4) incapacity 
to face unexpected financial expenses (set amount corresponding to the 
monthly national at risk-of-poverty threshold of the previous year); 5) 
household cannot afford a telephone (including a mobile phone); 6) 
household cannot afford a colour TV; 7) household cannot afford a washing 
machine; 8) household cannot afford a car; and 9) household unable to pay 
for keeping its home adequately warm.  
The category of people living in households with very low work 
intensity is described as the share of the population aged 0-59 living in 
households where the working-age members worked less than 20% of their 
total work potential during the past year. 
The work intensity of the household is defined as the ratio of the 
number of months that all working-age household members have been 
working during the income reference year to the total number of months 
that could theoretically have been worked by the same household members 
in the same period. When the respondent declares himself as a part-time 
worker, the number of worked hours per week is taken into account for the 
months with part-time work, on the basis of the situation for the number of 
worked hours at the time of interview.  
Source: Eurostat. 
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5.1 How to measure social cohesion? 
Concerning social cohesion, the Europe 2020 strategy has clearly shifted its 
focus. Instead of the overall goal of social cohesion being measured by a 
multi-dimensional approach, such as the Laeken indicators (see Atkinson et 
al., 2004; Marlier et al., 2007), in which the poverty rate was one indicator 
among many, the Europe 2020 strategy has put the rate of those at risk of 
poverty or exclusion32 in the most prominent place (although additionally 
citing the importance of employment and education for cohesion).33 More 
concretely, the Europe 2020 strategy proposes to reduce the number of 
persons at risk of poverty or exclusion by 20 million by the year 2020.34 But 
what is the overall situation in the EU-27 for the rates of being at risk of 
poverty or exclusion? As can be inferred from Figure 5.2, in 2009 23.1% of 
EU-27 citizens (or approximately 114 million persons as depicted in Figure 
5.1) were at risk of poverty or exclusion. The Europe 2020 goal to reduce 
this number by 20 million is thus to cut it by 17.5%.  
Yet how heterogeneous are the poverty or exclusion rates in the EU-
27? Like the heterogeneity in income inequality (Franzini, 2009; 
Dauderstädt & Keltec, 2011), the percentage of citizens at risk of poverty or 
exclusion varies significantly from country to country. In most of the 
coordinated countries35 (the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria, France and 
Germany), the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark and Finland), 
                                                   
32 The original benchmark of the Europe 2020 strategy – solely concentrating on the 
poverty rate after social transfers (to approximately 80 million persons in 2009) and on 
reducing this poverty rate by 25% to 60 million persons by the year 2020 – was revised 
by using a broader concept of poverty that not only covered the risk of poverty but also 
the risk of exclusion. The concept of this indicator includes around 114 million citizens. 
The new poverty benchmark agreed by the European Council on 17 June 2010 is to lift 
out of risk 20 million among the 114 million. The ratio is thus 17.5% instead of the 
original 25%.  
33 See the critique by Pochet (2010, p. 145), who clarifies that “the social dimension 
cannot be limited exclusively to the issue of poverty” and that “the solution is much 
more complex than merely raising educational levels”. 
34 The agreed measure for citizens at risk of poverty or exclusion consists of three 
different indicators: i) persons living in households with very low work intensity, ii) 
persons at risk of poverty after social transfers and iii) severely materially deprived 
persons. 
35 As noted earlier, for an introduction to the concept of ‘coordinated countries’, please 
see Hall & Soskice (2001). Contrary to the classification in Hall & Soskice (2001), France 
is considered in this study as a coordinated country. 
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the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Malta, the share of people at risk of 
poverty or exclusion is below 20%. 
Figure 5.2 Percentage of citizens at risk of poverty or exclusion (2009) 
 
Sources: Own calculations based on Eurostat data, Europe 2020 indicators. 
In the liberal (Ireland and the UK), Mediterranean (Cyprus, Spain, 
Italy, Portugal and Greece) and transition (Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria) countries, the share 
exceeds the 20% threshold, with the four countries Hungary, Latvia, 
Romania and Bulgaria having the highest poverty rates. In the case of 
Romania and Bulgaria, the rate of those at risk of poverty or exclusion 
almost reaches the 50% threshold, with nearly half of their citizens at risk of 
poverty or exclusion. The spread between Romania and Bulgaria on the 
one side and the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Sweden on the other 
vividly highlights the huge heterogeneity in the current EU-27, as well as 
the dramatic social conditions in Romania and Bulgaria.  
If one groups the data according to a regime typology, a ranking can 
be observed: the Scandinavian countries clearly lead the ranking, followed 
by the coordinated countries, the Mediterranean, the liberal and the 
transition countries (largely due to Romania and Bulgaria), and lastly by 
the three Baltic countries, which have the highest exposure to poverty and 
exclusion (Figure 5.3).  
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Figure 5.3 Percentage of citizens at risk of poverty or exclusion, grouped according 
to a regime typology (2009) 
 
Sources: Own calculations based on Eurostat data, Europe 2020 indicators. 
5.2 What social models for Europe? 
According to the literature (for example Sapir, 2006), there is a wide 
agreement that the European social model (or models, according to many) 
is (or rather, are) in severe difficulties. The diagnosis is that the 
combination of an ageing population and increasing competition from low-
wage countries is straining the capacity of governments everywhere to 
deliver the high degree of income distribution and insurance against risk 
that electorates have come to expect. The discussion about this issue often 
implicitly assumes that countries can somehow ‘choose’ what kind of 
model they want to adopt. Since over the last decade the Nordic countries 
have had the best economic performance within the EU, it is often argued 
that other countries have to adopt these ‘models’ if they want to remain 
competitive. This approach is misleading, however, as our results suggest 
that it is not possible to simply copy a different social model. Governments 
might be able to choose how much to spend on social security benefits, but 
they cannot guarantee the level of (in-)equality to which this will lead 
(assuming that the aim of social security benefits is to reduce inequality 
and poverty). Hence it might be more useful to think about different 
governments/societies as being more effective than others in alleviating 
poverty. Enhancing efficiency (thus defined) might be more important than 
increasing expenditure. 
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A popular line of thought maintains that there are basically four 
types of welfare-state models in Europe, which mix to a different degree 
employment and equity (or the acceptance of inequality) (see again Sapir, 
2006, pp. 379-380). These stereotypes are usually represented in a matrix 
with equity and efficiency as the two axes. Following Sapir,36 in Table 5.3 
we replicate his typology for the EU-27 in the year 2009 with the indicator 
for equity being the rate of the risk of poverty or exclusion and the 
indicator for efficiency being the employment rate.  
Table 5.3 Standard classification of social models in the EU-27 in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis 
  Efficiency (= employment?) 
Low High 
  
  
Equity  
(=1- poverty) 
High  Slovakia, Belgium, 
Malta 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Netherlands, France, 
Austria, Luxembourg, Slovenia, 
UK, Cyprus, Czech Republic 
Low Spain, Italy, 
Ireland, Greece, 
Poland, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Latvia, 
Romania, Bulgaria 
Estonia, Portugal 
Note: Countries with higher investment in intangible capital are depicted in italics. 
Sources: Own calculations based on Eurostat data, Europe 2020 indicators and 
INNODRIVE data. 
Grouping the EU-27 countries according to their mean value in the 
low and high classifications, we obtain a somewhat different picture than 
did Sapir (who analysed an EU-15 country sample). Whereas Sapir (2006) 
identified the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries as those likely to survive 
the challenges of globalisation, according to our results for the year 2009 (in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis), alongside the Nordic countries are not 
the Anglo-Saxon countries per se (as Ireland now ranges in the low/low 
category) but the coordinated countries Germany, the Netherlands, France, 
Austria and Luxembourg (grouped in the high/high classification) – 
                                                   
36 Sapir (2006) provides a useful restatement of this classification (based originally on 
work by Esping-Andersen, 1990; see also Boeri, 2002).  
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mainly those countries where efficiency is associated with equity. More 
interestingly, most of the countries that score high on efficiency and equity 
are highly innovative (in terms of their investment in intangible capital). 
Among most coordinated countries and the Scandinavian countries, the 
following countries have to be grouped in the high/high category: 
Slovenia, the Czech Republic, the Anglo-Saxon country UK and Cyprus. In 
contrast, the large Mediterranean countries (Spain, Italy and Greece) range 
in the low/low category along with the transition and Baltic countries.  
5.3 Government efficiency vs. social expenditure 
The above classification is nonetheless of little use in deriving policy 
conclusions. Does it imply that the societies of the countries in the ‘Club 
Med’ somehow prefer low employment (taken as synonymous with low 
efficiency by Sapir, 2006)? A more useful explanation of the differences 
between social models should start with what one can observe directly 
about political choices. One key variable in this respect is the amount a 
society is willing to spend on equity. This should also be the key variable 
for determining inequality. There are wide variations in this respect, 
ranging from low spending on social security benefits of only 12.6% of GDP 
in Latvia in 2008 to 27.8% and 28.2% in Austria and Germany, respectively 
(with the EU-15 average at around 27% of GDP) and maximum spending of 
30.8% in France. Figure 5.4 shows a scatter plot of social expenditure as a 
share of GDP and the percentage of citizens at risk of poverty or exclusion. 
Although one detects a negative association between social expenditure as 
a share of GDP and the percentage of those at risk of poverty or exclusion, 
in cases like Greece and Italy, a large amount of social expenditure is not 
directly associated with a lower risk. While Italy spends on average more 
than Finland, the latter achieves a much lower rate of risk.  
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Figure 5.4 Scatter plot of social expenditure as a share of GDP and the percentage 
of the population at risk of poverty or exclusion in the EU-27 (2008) 
 
Sources: Own calculations based on Eurostat data, Europe 2020 indicators. 
The picture changes significantly when analysing the relationship 
between government effectiveness and the rate of those at risk of poverty 
or exclusion in Figure 5.5. The scatter plot of government effectiveness and 
the percentage of the population at risk illustrates the strong association 
between the two. For example, countries with low levels of government 
effectiveness, such as Romania, Bulgaria, Italy, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Hungary, tend to have higher levels of citizens at risk of poverty or 
exclusion. In countries with higher levels of government effectiveness, for 
instance Finland, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, 
such risks are lower. This finding is also very well embedded in the 
literature. For example, Holmberg et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence 
that the poverty rate is negatively related to government effectiveness. 
From the literature they find on the one hand that the quality of 
government is positively related to economic growth, which obviously 
reduces poverty, while on the other hand the growth may work to the 
disadvantage of the poor. Still, it is argued that in countries with a high 
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quality of government the economic growth outweighs the possible 
negative distributional effects on poverty.  
Figure 5.5 Scatter plot of government effectiveness and the percentage of the 
population at risk of poverty or exclusion in the EU-27 (2008) 
 
Sources: Own calculations based on Eurostat data and Governance Indicators 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). 
Table 5.4 shows a cross-section analysis (using the 27 EU countries as 
units of analysis) of the determinants of the risk of poverty or exclusion. 
Regression 1 reveals first of all that social expenditure as a % of GDP is not 
significantly associated with the risk of poverty or exclusion. By contrast, 
government effectiveness has a significantly negative effect. We also find, 
not surprisingly a strong negative correlation between the percentage of 
people at risk of poverty or exclusion and the Gini coefficient which 
measures inequality in the income distribution. Also not surprisingly we 
find that a higher national income (GDP per capita) is associated with a 
lower incidence of people at risk of poverty or exclusion. As expected, a 
country dummy including the cases Romania and Bulgaria delivers a 
strong positive coefficient 
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Table 5.4 Dependent variable: Risk of poverty or exclusion 
People at risk of poverty or exclusion  Coefficient Standard error 
Government effectiveness -4.7*** 1.54 
Social protection expenditure -0.04 0.09 
Gini coefficient 0.65*** 0.18 
GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) -0.09*** 0.02 
Dummy for Romania and Bulgaria 10.9*** 1.46 
Constant 11.8 7.28 
R-square 0.92 - 
Observations 27 - 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Robust standard errors are presented. 
Sources: Own calculations based on Eurostat data and Governance Indicators 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). 
Therefore, those countries with more effective governments, lower 
inequality and higher income have lower poverty rates (although causality 
could clearly also run the other way around, such that countries with 
greater equity are more easily able to construct better institutions and 
generate higher incomes). We interpret the regression results as a first 
indication that, again, the quality of the institutions is more important than 
the quantity of social expenditure. In many countries it should be possible 
to reduce income inequality and thereby help to lift more citizens from 
poverty or exclusion without spending more, but just by spending more 
judiciously.  
5.4 Early school leavers and poverty rates 
As the indicator ‘early school leavers’ is closely connected with enabling 
citizens to find employment and a higher risk of ending up in poverty, this 
indicator is discussed here rather than in the chapter on the educational 
goals. Figure 5.6 depicts the rate of school dropouts and identifies which 
countries have already achieved the benchmark of below 10% and which 
countries still have to work hard to achieve that target. It becomes 
immediately apparent that the Mediterranean and transition countries will 
have the greatest difficulties in tackling the benchmark. Astonishingly, the 
EU-15 economies Spain and Portugal each have a rate of over 30%. In Italy 
the rate is close to 20%. As discussed earlier, a skills upgrade in the fourth 
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and fifth largest European economies Italy and Spain seems of utmost 
importance for the EU and the eurozone. Large economic gains could be 
achieved through such an advance.  
Figure 5.6 Early school leavers in the EU-27: Percentage of the population aged 
18-24 with only lower secondary education and not in education (2009) 
 
Sources: Own calculations based on Eurostat data, Europe 2020 indicators. 
5.5 Social cohesion – Adequately addressed? 
In drawing conclusions, while the indicator for the risk of poverty or 
exclusion seems crucial for social cohesion, social cohesion cannot be 
reduced to this set of indicators alone. Whereas social cohesion had a 
prominent place in the original Lisbon strategy in 2000, it lost some 
importance in the revised 2005 strategy. In the Europe 2020 strategy, social 
cohesion has been further diminished to an index consisting of three 
indicators. European policy-makers are completely mistaken if they think 
that social cohesion is a soft indicator, which does not need concentrated 
attention. Social and political cohesion are among the prerequisites for 
European economies and trivialising the social dimension in Europe will 
threaten long-term economic prosperity. Instead of reducing the set of 
indicators to measure social cohesion, the Europe 2020 strategy should 
have broadened the set of indicators, for example by including citizens’ 
normative perceptions, i.e. the levels of interpersonal and systemic trust 
(see Roth, 2009a, b). Another aspect that is missing in the ‘inclusive’ part of 
the Europe 2020 strategy is inequality, of which the poverty rate is but one 
element. It is well documented in fact that income inequality started to 
increase in the US by the end of the 1970s. Europe was not immune to the 
affliction: wage differentials widened in Europe as well, although on a 
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different scale and at varying times in the individual countries. An OECD 
study (2008), for instance, shows that in developed countries income 
inequality has increased since the mid-1980s and even more significantly 
since 2000 in Germany, Italy and Finland. Europe 2020 relies on education 
and its automatic positive effect on employment to solve the inequality 
puzzle.  
We should carefully consider the remarks of Giddens (2006a, 2006b 
and 2007), who has pointed out that the EU’s future prosperity can only be 
achieved alongside strengthening Europe’s social model. Moreover, it 
seems that government efficiency plays an important role in tackling the 
risk of poverty or exclusion. Although our empirical results are 
preliminary, as we do not address the issue of causality, theoretical 
assumptions and common sense would suggest that the link would most 
likely run from effective governmental structures to lowered rates of the 
population at risk of poverty or exclusion. In this instance, one has to stress 
that government efficiency is not only crucial for combating poverty and 
exclusion but also for effectively implementing investment in innovation 
and human capital. Finally, our categorisation of EU-27 countries in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis according to the two criteria of efficiency 
and equity clarifies that the coordinated countries, along with Nordic 
countries, have succeeded in combining efficiency with equity. This finding 
underscores the assertion that coordinated countries seem to be better 
equipped for the challenges of globalisation than originally expected.  
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6. MEETING THE 20/20/20 CLIMATE AND 
ENERGY TARGETS  
he impact of the crisis and the shifting balance of economic weights 
in the global economy are particularly important in the field of 
climate change. Indeed one could argue that the headline goal of the 
2020 strategy has become obsolete. 
The 2020 strategy has designated three goals in the area of climate 
change and energy: 
1) GHG emissions (binding) – a reduction of 20% by 2020 compared with 
1990 as outlined by the EU’s revised Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) 
Directive 2009/29/EC (-21% compared with 2005) and an “effort-
sharing decision” for non-ETS sectors (-10% compared with 2005). 
Emissions, including those from international aviation, were 
estimated to be 16% below the 1990 levels in 2009 (European 
Commission, 2011f); 
2) Renewables (binding) – an increase in the share of renewable energy in 
gross final energy consumption to 20% by 2020 (in 2008 this share 
was at 10.3% (Eurostat, 2011); and 
3) Energy efficiency (non-binding) – a reduction of primary energy 
consumption by 20% by the year 2020 compared with projections.  
In this chapter, we concentrate on the first goal. Concerning the 
second goal, achieving a share of 20% for renewables seems within reach 
given that renewables already have a share of over 10%. The third goal, 
however (which is in any case not binding), is unlikely to be met. The 
projections in 2007 showed that a reduction of energy consumption of 368 
mtoe (million tonnes of energy equivalent) would be needed to attain this 
goal (European Commission, 2011g). But the sum of the ‘pledges’ of 
member states towards this goal amounts to only 207 mtoe, less than 60% 
of what would be needed. This has been officially acknowledged: “With 
T
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current policies, only half of the 20% energy efficiency target would be met 
by 2020” (European Commission, 2011f). 
With respect to achieving a reduction of 20% of GHG emissions by 
2020 (relative to 1990 levels), the impact of the crisis is obvious here. The 
deep recession provoked by the financial crisis has reduced emissions in 
the EU so much that the first ‘green’ target (GHG emissions in 2020 that are 
20% lower than in 1990) has by some measures already been realised. 
Moreover, the bursting of the credit bubble that precipitated the crisis has 
also led to a sharp downwards revision in expected future growth rates of 
the EU for the remainder of this decade (and the renewed euro crisis of the 
summer of 2011 has further lowered projections). What seemed ambitious 
during the years 2005-08 when the environmental targets were formulated 
seems easy to accomplish today. The level of emissions of 2009 was already 
16% below the 1990 benchmark. One should of course expect some growth 
until 2020, but right now it appears that the recovery of the European 
economy from the crisis will be rather slow. The revision of growth 
prospects can be seen from the changes in the official forecasts of the IMF 
between 2008 and 2011. The difference in the level of GDP predicted by the 
IMF in its World Economic Outlook of early 2011 and that of early 2008 
amounts to about 12% (and the subsequent growth rates have also been 
revised downwards by about 0.62% p.a.) (IMF, 2008, 2011). By contrast the 
growth prospects of the emerging economies in Asia have not been revised 
downwards at all. One consequence of this will be that the share of the EU 
in global energy demand will continue to decline (see Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1 Share of world primary energy demand (%) 
 2000 2010 2020 
EU 16 14 12 
US 23 11 16 
Non-OECD Asian countries 22 30 35 
Source: Own calculations based on IEA (2010). 
The observation that the current goal of reducing emissions is not 
very challenging is not just a theoretical calculation based on growth 
forecasts. It can also be seen from the key market-based indicator that the 
EU’s emission trading scheme has created, namely the price of emissions 
allowances, which has fallen to around €12-15 per tonne.  
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The consequences of the rapid growth of emerging economies, chiefly 
China, should have been anticipated even earlier in the last decade when 
the EU’s climate goals were formulated. Given the fast growth of the 
emerging economies, the contribution of the EU to global emissions is 
declining so swiftly that the impact of the EU’s efforts on global emissions 
will become marginal. Most projections indicate that by 2020 the EU will 
account for about 10% of total, global GHG emissions. If the EU were to 
decide to increase its own ambitions by going for a 30% reduction instead 
of the 20% foreseen in the 2020 strategy, this would reduce global emissions 
by around 1%. The goal in terms of increasing the share of renewables from 
10% to 20% would have an even smaller impact on global emissions: 
assuming renewables produce only half of the CO2 emissions of 
conventional sources, a substitution of another 10 percentage points of EU 
energy production should lead to a reduction in global emissions of about 
0.5%.  
In short, one must thus accept that the EU cannot hope to have a 
noticeable impact on global climate change by just reducing domestic 
emissions. The key problem instead is the carbon intensity of the high 
growth in emerging economies, especially China. 
6.1 A border tax to protect the global environment?  
Greenhouse gas emissions represent a classic case of an external effect. One 
way to deal with this problem would be through multilateral negotiations 
with the aim of inducing every country to participate in the solution. This 
has by now been tried for over 20 years, but to little effect. The latest major 
effort in Copenhagen failed completely to produce a binding global 
agreement. As a result the EU is de facto the only major economic actor 
with a binding target.37 
                                                   
37  The Chinese government has recently announced that it is taking the unilateral 
commitment “that by 2020 China’s carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP will be 
dropped by between 40-45% compared with 2005”. At first sight, this appears to 
constitute a major commitment. It is not clear, however, whether this implies a major 
departure from the baseline. The emissions intensity of the Chinese economy should 
fall in any case, as services become relatively more important. It is thus difficult to say 
whether this target implies a meaningful price for carbon. Moreover, the Chinese plan 
foresees no carbon pricing in the manufacturing sector. The target is mainly to be 
reached by massive investments in alternative power generation. This implies that the 
economic argument for a carbon tariff (that production and hence pollution will move 
abroad) remains fully valid. 
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The costs and benefits of carbon border measures have been 
extensively discussed in the rapidly expanding body of literature on the 
economics of climate-change mitigation policies, but most studies 
concentrate on competitiveness (of energy-intensive industries) and carbon 
leakage. Only a few studies examine the international trade impacts of a so-
called ‘carbon border tax’ and none seems to look at the welfare 
implications from a global point of view. See Veenendaal & Manders 
(2008), McKibben & Wilcoxen (2008), Majocchi & Missaglia (2002), and the 
VoxEU columns by John Whalley (2008, 2009). 
The global perspective, however, is the correct one. Climate change 
policy, even when implemented at the national level, is motivated by a 
concern for global (as opposed to national) welfare. It is thus important to 
adopt the same point of view when discussing so-called ‘border measures’. 
An important but often overlooked issue is the distinction between plain 
import tariffs (on the carbon content of goods imported) and the 
combination of import tariffs plus export rebates. Box 6.1 looks at the case 
where there is no export rebate. 
 
Box 6.1. A simple illustration of the welfare gain from the introduction of a 
carbon tariff 
This illustration relies on the most standard case, using a partial equilibrium 
approach, to show the nature of the impact of a carbon tax (i.e. a tariff on the 
carbon content of imports) on global welfare. 
There is only one good (of which the home country is a net importer). 
As usual the world is divided into two actors, an importing country (or 
group of importing countries) and the rest of the world. But the two have 
identical supply and demand curves and the same carbon intensity of 
production! 
What are the welfare implications of the tariff? The standard welfare 
loss caused by a tariff is the usual triangle (consumer plus producer loss). As 
is well known, this welfare loss is of second order for any ‘small’ tariff 
because for the first units affected by a tariff the welfare loss per unit is 
approximately equal to zero. 
In this case, however, there is also a gain due to the global externality 
in production. It is much larger because it is of first order given that for all 
units that are not produced, the world experiences a welfare gain equal to 
the difference between the social cost and the private cost of production. It 
follows that a small carbon tariff must always improve global welfare. 
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The intuition behind this result is clear. As long as the tariff is small, 
the reallocation of consumption from consumers at home to consumers 
abroad causes only a loss of second-order importance. But the gain to global 
welfare from lower foreign production is of first-order importance. This 
argument is completely independent of the size of carbon leakage. Thus, 
those who oppose carbon taxes on the grounds of lost sectoral 
competitiveness (e.g. Gurria, 2009) miss the key issue. 
6.2 Policy implications 
The practical policy implications of this analysis are clear: the world would 
benefit from the imposition of a (small) carbon import tariff by the EU (the 
only significant region in the world with a cap-and-trade system in 
operation). 38  The justification for the tariff would nevertheless be 
completely different from the one usually advanced by politicians (and 
industry). It would not be to ‘level the playing field’ for EU industry, but to 
protect the global environment. This is a crucial difference since it implies 
that the tariff would be compatible with the rules of the World Trade 
Organization, whose Article XX allows for exemptions if the aim is to 
protect a global natural resource.39 
6.3 How high should the tariff be? 
In a fully specified model (Gros, 2009a), it is shown that indeed there is a 
tariff that maximises global welfare (under the assumption that the home 
country has a cap-and-trade system but the rest of the world does not). The 
optimal tariff is approximately equal to the externality in production 
abroad. 
                                                   
38 Institutionally it would be straightforward. The EU has exclusive competence for all 
matters concerning the customs union. Any decision to impose a carbon border tax 
would have to start with an initiative by the European Commission, which then needs 
to be approved by the Council and the European Parliament. Approval in the Council 
only requires a qualified majority. 
39 The economics of a carbon import tariff is clear. The politics is rather messy. A 
massive increase in EU tariffs against developing-country exports would certainly 
make them feel disadvantaged. While global welfare would increase, they might lose. 
There is an easy way out of the political problems, however. The EU could simply 
promise to use the proceeds from the tariff to help poorer exporting countries reduce 
the carbon intensity of their economies. 
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To calculate how high a carbon import tax of the EU might be, one 
should start from an estimate of the carbon content of imports. Weber et al. 
(2008) suggest that the total CO2 embodied in Chinese (2005 data) exports 
was around 1,670 million tonnes of CO2, or over 30% of all Chinese 
emissions (in jargon this is the so-called ‘embodied emissions in exports’ 
measure). 
This percentage corresponds roughly to the share of exports in the 
Chinese economy (around 35%). Given total Chinese exports in 2005 of 
around $760 billion, this implies an average carbon intensity of a little more 
than two tonnes of CO2 per $1,000 of exports. Table 1 in Gros (2009b) 
provides further evidence on differences in carbon intensities, showing a 
similar order of magnitude for other countries, such as India and Russia. 
The final piece of information needed is the domestic carbon price. At 
present the carbon price within the ETS fluctuates at around €12-13 per 
tonne (or a bit less than $20 per tonne of CO2). This would translate into an 
import tariff of about 3.5-4% (two times $17-20 per $1,000 of imports from 
China) for the average Chinese exports to the EU. This is not negligible – 
indeed it is close to the average tariffs for most-favoured nations, which are 
of the same order of magnitude. Even so, it is unlikely to have a strong 
impact on the carbon intensity of production in China. 
Prior to the crisis, the European Commission had estimated that a 
carbon price of around €40-50 per tonne would be required to reach the 
EU’s 2020 commitments. The reason the actual carbon price is so much 
lower is probably simply that the crisis has reduced the GDP expected for 
2020 by so much, perhaps by about 10%. (The crisis itself led to a loss of 
GDP of around 5% on impact. Moreover, growth rates might have been 
reduced by about half a percent going forward. Over ten years these two 
effects would sum to around 10%.) At current exchange rates, this would 
translate into about $50-65 per tonne, and thus a carbon import tariff of 
slightly over 10%. Still, as China upgrades the sophistication of its exports 
and thus reduces its carbon intensity, the average rate will come down. 
6.4 Summary 
The discussion in this chapter implies that the current 2020 climate goals do 
not require a big effort by the EU, which is reflected in the low carbon price 
in the ETS. Economic theory shows that it would make sense to 
complement the internal carbon pricing with pricing at the border. But 
under the current unambitious targets, it does not make sense for the EU to 
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incur the political cost of imposing a carbon import tax when it would be so 
low (3%?).  
The EU thus has to choose between two options: 
1) Confirm the unambitious current 2020 goals. In this case it cannot 
really claim ‘moral leadership’ and the impact on global warming 
will be negligible. 
2) Increase the level of ambition to minus 30% (compared with the 1990 
baseline). This would imply a higher internal carbon price, restore 
moral leadership and also provide the justification for pricing carbon 
at the border. Altogether, this would translate into a significant 
carbon price for imports from high carbon-intensity countries, such as 
China, India and Russia, and could have a significant effect on the 
carbon intensity of production outside the EU. 
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7. THE EUROPE 2020 STRATEGY AND THE 
EU’S BROADER ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE  
he Europe 2020 strategy has been developed as the successor to the 
Lisbon strategy as a long-term approach to dealing with structural 
weaknesses in Europe’s economy (Bongardt & Torres, 2010). One 
aspect that is supposed to differentiate the Europe 2020 strategy from the 
Lisbon strategy is the concentration on five key specific targets. These five 
targets are supposed to be representative of the overall goal of smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth. The underlying vision of the EU as a 
social market economy is broader, however, and is outlined in the three 
priorities and the flagship initiatives (European Commission, 2010a). To 
achieve the Europe 2020 strategy, the Council has proposed a set of ten 
guidelines (listed in Table 7.1 and discussed below). This set of guidelines 
is meant to steer the member states in implementing policies to achieve the 
targets (European Commission, 2010b). 
The Europe 2020 strategy has to be seen in the wider context of 
economic governance of the Union, and in particular the euro area. We 
briefly discuss some of the major elements of this structure.  
Although the Europe 2020 strategy was initiated after the crisis, it 
was not designed as a response to the crisis. Yet the debt crisis in the euro 
area that followed the global economic and financial crisis exposed the 
need for reinforced European economic governance, in particular in the 
economic and monetary union (EMU), as a necessary condition for 
building an appropriate environment in which the Europe 2020 strategy 
could work. Therefore, new initiatives were set up to better react to current 
challenges. These initiatives are mainly represented by the economic 
governance package presented by the Commission, of which the European 
semester (European Commission, 2011e) is a core part (European 
T
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Commission, 2011a, b, c, d) along with the introduction of the Euro-plus 
Pact (European Council, 2011).  
Table 7.1 Overview of all the guidelines and goals in the different strategies 
Europe 2020 Integrated Guidelines Annual Growth 
Survey 
Euro-plus Pact 
 Ensuring the quality and the 
sustainability of public finance 
 Addressing macroeconomic 
imbalances 
 Reducing imbalances in the euro area 
 Optimising support for R&D and 
innovation, strengthening the 
knowledge triangle and unleashing 
the potential of the digital economy 
 Improving resource efficiency and 
reducing GHG emissions 
 Improving the business and consumer 
environment and modernising the 
industrial base 
 Increasing labour market participation 
and reducing structural 
unemployment 
 Developing a skilled workforce 
responding to labour market needs, 
promoting job quality and lifelong 
learning 
 Improving the performance of 
education and training systems at all 
levels and increasing participation in 
tertiary education 
 Promoting social inclusion and 
combating poverty 
 Implementing a 
rigorous fiscal 
consolidation 
 Correcting 
macroeconomic 
imbalances 
 Ensuring stability 
of the financial 
sector 
 Making work more 
attractive 
 Reforming pension 
systems 
 Getting the 
unemployed back 
to work 
 Balancing security 
and flexibility 
 Tapping the 
potential of the 
single market 
 Attracting private 
capital to finance 
growth 
 Creating cost-
effective access to 
energy 
 Fostering 
competitive-
ness 
 Fostering 
employment 
 Enhancing 
the sustaina-
bility of 
public 
finances 
 Reinforcing 
financial 
stability 
Source: European Council (2011). 
Besides the difference in the method followed for strengthening 
economic governance, namely the community method in the first case and 
the intergovernmental approach in the case of the Euro-plus Pact, both, at 
least on paper, seek to improve coordination. The package presented by the 
Commission concentrates on downstream coordination, in the 
implementation of policy decisions and the surveillance of the results 
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achieved, while the Euro-plus Pact seeks to facilitate upstream coordination 
among governments in intentions before specific policies are set and 
implemented. Again, at least on paper this should reflect the fact that fiscal 
decisions are still part of the national domain. 
Yet, what is sometimes easy to identify on paper is much more 
complex in reality, and different elements of economic governance can 
periodically overlap or even conflict in their EU or euro area dimensions. 
7.1 The European semester 
The European semester is a newly developed strategy to foster a higher 
degree of coordination in economic policies at the EU level. It aims at 
ensuring a closer alignment between the member states and the EU. The 
European semester starts with the Annual Growth Survey, which provides 
an analysis of the progress towards the Europe 2020 targets (European 
Commission, 2011c), the macroeconomic situation (European Commission, 
2011b) and the employment conditions (European Commission, 2011d), 
and should thus provide a roadmap towards growth (European 
Commission, 2011a). The goal of the Annual Growth Survey is mainly to 
identify all actions necessary in the short term to deal with current 
problems and to move structurally towards the Europe 2020 objectives 
(European Commission, 2010a). Unlike the Europe 2020 strategy, the 
European semester has a stronger and more complete framework to 
monitor, discuss, evaluate and enforce policy goals set at the European 
level to achieve growth, competitiveness and stability in the EU. The 
European semester has thus been established to cover both the Europe 2020 
and the overall economic situation in the member states, including the 
short-term challenges (European Commission, 2011e). 
7.2 Macroeconomic surveillance  
The Commission proposal introduces a pillar for the prevention and the 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances, which are broadly seen as the 
main causes of the economic crisis. The alert mechanism of the pillar is 
based on the creation of a scoreboard, which aims at identifying member 
states with potentially problematic macroeconomic imbalances. The 
scoreboard closely monitors several indicators that are most likely to give 
an early signal of both internal and external imbalances (European 
Economic and Social Committee, 2011). The indicators of external 
imbalances are likely to include the following three: i) the current account 
balance as a share of GDP, ii) net foreign financial asset position as a share 
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of GDP and iii) change in the real effective exchange rate. The indicators of 
internal imbalances will involve four signals: i) change in real house prices 
or as an alternative, change in the value added in the construction sector, ii) 
private sector debt-to-GDP ratio, iii) change in private sector credit and iv) 
public sector debt as a share of GDP. 
Although the choice of the scoreboard indicators may look somewhat 
arbitrary at first glance, the European Commission (European Parliament, 
2011) stresses the importance of an economic reading of the scoreboard in 
contrast to a mechanical reading. The thresholds for the indicators are 
purely indicative and serve as alert levels. Once a country is expected to be 
affected (or at risk of being affected) by macroeconomic imbalances, the 
Commission will conduct an in-depth review of that member state, which 
will take into account country-specific circumstances. Following the 
review, the European Council will be informed of possible imbalances for 
the country and the Council in its turn will issue recommendations to the 
member state. The country should then submit a corrective action plan 
based on the Commission’s review. Thereafter progress will be observed by 
the European Commission.  
The scoreboard attributes particular importance to external balance 
variables as potential indicators of a crisis. An implicit assumption behind 
this approach is that a country experiencing a persistent external imbalance 
should be called upon to make adjustments. In this context, the key 
adjustment mechanism works through lower wage costs, which would 
improve the real exchange rate and hence foster exports, and thereby 
contribute to absorbing the imbalance. Despite the logic of this reasoning, 
as shown in Alcidi & Gros (2010), this does not always correspond to 
reality: data suggest that those countries that have experienced the largest 
losses of competitiveness over the last decade, for instance Ireland, were 
also the ones with the highest gains in productivity.  
De Grauwe (2011) recently argued that although the proposal for the 
scoreboard is a step in the right direction, it also has limitations. He points 
out that countries have only a limited amount of control over the variables 
monitored by the European Commission – local booms and bubbles were 
mainly created through excessive credit expansion and it is this 
combination of bubbles and credit expansion that makes the bubbles 
dangerous. Therefore, a system to correct for national imbalances also has 
to deal with local country credit expansion. In this respect, monetary policy 
could play a role in preventing imbalances. While it is often argued that the 
ECB mandate includes only price stability and that the ECB lacks 
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instruments to provide financial stability, De Grauwe maintains that the 
Eurosystem, by allowing different reserve requirements to be set in the 
individual countries, can affect money creation and thus credit expansion.  
7.3 The Euro-plus Pact 
The Euro-plus Pact was concluded in March 2011 as a complement to the 
important financial support mechanism in the euro area. It seeks to 
reinforce the economic pillar of the EMU by enhancing economic policy 
coordination among its members and increasing competitiveness – 
especially in those countries currently experiencing difficulties – which 
should lead to more convergence in the eurozone. At present, six non-EMU 
countries (Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania) 
have also decided to adhere to the pact. The pact concerns national 
competences and has put competitiveness at its core. The four main goals 
of the pact are listed in Table 7.1 (European Council, 2011). 
But the current effort of a grand design for competitiveness that aims 
at reducing divergences among countries by means of procedures and rules 
is neither likely to help solve the eurozone crisis nor enhance European 
economic governance for the following reasons. First, the various elements 
that have been proposed to measure competitiveness tend to be flawed and 
of limited usefulness (see Gros, 2012). This might appear to be a technical 
point, but it is crucial because if the elaboration of new mechanisms is of 
little use to prevent future crises (or to resolve the present one), it will only 
increase the sense that the EU is unable to cope with its own problems. 
Second, focusing exclusively on how to reduce divergences as suggested by 
the competitiveness indicators may risk monopolising attention on the 
symptoms, more specifically the divergence in competitiveness itself, rather 
than on the real disease, i.e. why this has happened. 40  Finally yet 
importantly, the current crisis is a sovereign and bank debt crisis, but the 
ongoing debate about governance has actually failed to address the debt 
issue, and as a consequence, has been unable to resolve the crisis.  
7.4 Conclusions 
Economic policy coordination takes place in many frameworks and also 
with different groups of participants. Box 7.1 shows only the most 
important ones. Variable geometry and coordination among different 
                                                   
40 See Alcidi & Gros (2010). 
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frameworks are key issues for the economic governance of the EU in 
general.  
Box 7.1 Variable geometry in economic policy coordination 
All countries participate officially in the Europe 2020, but some countries 
participate in closer cooperation than others and one member state shows 
little enthusiasm for the 2020 strategy. 
Euro area 17 countries 
Euro-plus Pact 23 countries: Euro area-17 plus 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and 
Romania 
Not in Euro-plus Pact but full Europe 2020 Estonia, Hungary, Czech 
Republic 
No national target in Europe 2020 strategy United Kingdom 
 
The Europe 2020 strategy is a broad growth strategy designed to 
identify medium and long-term priorities that should help EU member 
states improve employment, social cohesion and productivity. This goal is 
independent of whether a specific member country is in the euro area or 
participates in the Euro-plus Pact. The recession of 2008-09 and the ongoing 
eurozone debt crisis have created an environment in which the 
achievement of these objectives is becoming much more difficult. As a 
response, member states and the European institutions have decided to 
reinforce economic governance in the euro area in order to achieve greater 
economic coordination. The underlying assumption is that an improvement 
of the existing institutions and tougher rules will re-establish favourable 
conditions for implementing the Europe 2020 strategy. In this sense, despite 
the Europe 2020 strategy not being part of the new emerging European (or 
rather euro area) governance architecture, it is strictly related to it. The 
fundamental question is whether greater economic coordination, at many 
different levels and in a number of different frameworks, can deliver the 
conditions for the Europe 2020 strategy to work. As argued above, there is 
room for scepticism. The crisis is not over yet and governance reforms have 
been unable to stop its course so far. The main reason is that the roots of the 
crisis have not been addressed by the large number of governance reforms 
at the European level.  
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At present all the attention is engaged on how to deal with the 
eurozone crisis. The non-euro member countries are receiving much less 
attention. The challenge for policy-makers, at both the national and the EU 
level, is thus to ensure that the need to deal with the immediate crisis does 
not divert attention from longer-term issues that are so important for 
competitiveness. 
One important problem in maintaining the cohesion of the overall 
framework for economic governance lies in the alternative meanings of 
‘competitiveness’ across different parts of the framework. We have argued 
that in the context of the Europe 2020 strategy competitiveness essentially 
means productivity. But in the context of the Euro-plus Pact, 
competitiveness is more concerned with the relative cost of labour in 
individual member countries. 
The need for some enforcement mechanism within the Europe 2020 
has already become apparent in the first year of its existence. As 
documented in this study, in many cases the bottom-up approach does not 
seem to be working: the sum of the national commitments or targets does 
not add up to what member states have agreed to collectively. If the Europe 
2020 strategy is to avoid the fate of the Lisbon strategy, this is the key issue 
to be addressed. However, there is little sign that this is about to happen. 
All in all it appears, however, that the best hope for consistent 
‘delivery’ of the reforms that are needed in many countries lies in sustained 
pressure from financial markets rather than the more elaborate mechanisms 
of European economic governance that have been enacted so far.  
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
ur final assessment of the Europe 2020 strategy is ambivalent. On 
the one hand, the strategy correctly emphasises education as a key 
policy parameter. As our study has shown, education seems to play 
a significant role in promoting innovation, increasing employment and also 
potentially reducing poverty by cutting the rate of early school leavers. On 
the other hand, the Europe 2020 strategy has weaknesses. In the realm of 
education, the strategy focuses exclusively on quantitative indicators. It 
should also take into account qualitative indicators like university rankings, 
which would reveal the weaknesses of most European economies in 
comparison with the US. Furthermore, its definition of innovation, which 
focuses solely on R&D, seems flawed. The new concept of intangible capital 
should be used instead. Concerning social cohesion, the strategy’s attention 
appears to concentrate too narrowly on poverty or exclusion to encompass 
the full domain of social cohesion, not even including the measure of 
income inequality. Moreover, it seems the aggregate EU-27 indicator masks 
deep divergences between old and new member states. 
Meanwhile, the ongoing debt crisis in the euro area has revealed deep 
north–south differences within the EU.  
For a start, investment in education has to be strengthened in 
particular within the Mediterranean countries, in terms of both quantity 
and quality. For example, Spain and Italy must reduce their school dropout 
rates, and Italy in particular has to increase its tertiary graduation rate. The 
foregoing especially applies to women in the labour force in these two 
countries, whose skill levels have to be upgraded. Mediterranean countries 
should also invest more in intangible capital (and thus in innovation) to 
strengthen their long-term competitiveness. All of this is necessary not only 
to allow the EU to reach its own 2020 targets, but also to allow these 
countries to overcome the current crisis. 
O
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Yet all this might only be possible if the public institutions in these 
countries are improved. Investments in education and innovation in the 
Mediterranean countries will increase (and yield large benefits) only once 
the social capital41 and institutions in these countries have been enhanced. 
This argument also holds for the transition countries, whose levels of 
government effectiveness and systemic trust remain low. 42  A sufficient 
level of government effectiveness throughout the EU-27 is a critical 
condition for making the EU as a whole more competitive.  
Our report does not discuss the role of EU financing in the 2020 
strategy. But a clear implication would be that the structural funds should 
be used to build social capital and effective institutions rather than airports 
and highways. Investment in education is of course useful, but our research 
suggests that investment in other ‘intangible capital’, such as firm-specific 
training, design and IT innovation might be even more important.  
Finally, on the ‘green front’, the recession and the slow recovery have 
made it rather easy to attain the first headline goal, namely a reduction of 
GHG emissions by 20%. The conditions seem ripe to move to a more 
ambitious target, namely a reduction of 30% and to complement the 
internal pricing of carbon through the European Emissions Trading System 
with an external dimension, namely a carbon import tax.  
                                                   
41 See Roth (2009a), who argues that those European countries with lower levels of 
interpersonal trust should invest in trust-building measures. 
42 See Roth (2009b). 
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ANNEX 
Figure A.1 Investment in new intangible capital by businesses in the EU-27 
compared with R&D, 1995-2005 
 
Source: Own estimations based on INNODRIVE data. 
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Figure A.2 Average PISA* scores, 2009 
 
* Programme for International Student Assessment. 
Source: Own estimations based on OECD data. 
 
Figure A.3 Catch-up process of the 10 transition countries  
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Table A.1 Official Europe 2020 targets1 
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Table A.1, cont. 
 
1As set by member states in their National Reform Programmes in April 2011. 
2The national emissions reduction targets defined in Decision 2009/406/EC (or “Effort Sharing Decision”) concerns the emissions not covered by the Emissions 
Trading System. The emissions covered by the Emissions Trading System will be reduced by 21% compared to 2005 levels. The corresponding overall emissions 
reduction will be -20% compared to 1990 levels. 
3Addition of nationals targets. 
Source: As set by member states in their National Reform Programmes in April 2011 (see http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/targets/eu-targets/index_en.htm). 
